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LAWYERS AND LOYALTY
MICHAEL K. MCCHRYSTAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Admonitions to be loyal flow freely in discussions of lawyering.
Geoffrey Hazard warns that "[i]n the relationship with a client,
the lawyer is required above all to demonstrate loyalty."' Charles
Wolfram emphasizes: "Whatever may be the models that obtain
in other legal cultures, the client-lawyer relationship in the United
States is founded on the lawyer's virtually total loyalty to the
client and the client's interests."2
The concept of loyalty is a fulcrum in the persistent struggle
to define the nature of lawyering. William Simon, for example,
characterizes the conventional discourse on legal ethics in terms
of models that emphasize loyalty to the client versus loyalty to
the public.3 As Simon's characterization suggests, legal ethicists
fundamentally disagree about the relation between the lawyer's
moral obligations to the client and those to the community, an
issue of practical importance because these obligations are po-
tentially in conflict in every representation.4 The central question
in legal ethics, concisely phrased by Charles Fried, is whether
"a decent and morally sensitive person can conduct himself ac-
cording to the traditional conception of professional loyalty and
still believe that what he is doing is morally worthwhile."'
This question arises because loyalty, as it happens, has a cost.
Loyalty influences behavior; it impels one to do what, in the
absence of loyalty, one would not do; it changes the moral
equation for deciding on a proper course of action.
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. A.B., University of Michigan,
1972; J.D., Marquette University, 1975. I am especially grateful to Thomas Diaz, Mary
Joe Frug, Curt Nyquist, Peter Rofes, and Barry Stearns for the many ways in which
they were helpful in the development of this Article.
1. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis,
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 21 (1987).
2. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (1986) (citations omitted).
3. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1084-90
(1988).
4. Id.
5. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1065 (1976).
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To use Monroe Freedman's famous examples, the duty of
loyalty has been used to justify the following conduct by a lawyer:
cross-examin[ing] for the purpose of discrediting the reliability
or credibility of an adverse witness whom [the lawyer] know[s]
to be telling the truth . . . put[ting] a witness on the stand
when [the lawyer knows the witness] will commit perjury...
and [giving a] client legal advice when [the lawyer has] reason
to believe that the knowledge [the lawyer gives the client] will
tempt [the client] to commit perjury.8
Similarly, the duty of loyalty has been used to justify a lawyer's
advice to a client on how to avoid the effects of a fair tax or a
regulation in the public interest and also to justify a lawyer's
assertion of a technical defense to defeat a debt that the client
admits she owes. 7
Loyalty, in other words, has been used to justify deception
and unfairness. It can change the moral equation to produce an
undesirable result. How, then, does loyalty come to carry such
weight? Is it worthy of the weight it is assigned?
Because loyalty is central to the continuing discussions of the
lawyer ethos, as recognized by Fried, Simon, and other scholars,8
an understanding of the lawyer's loyalty obligation to clients is
important. A satisfactory explanation of loyalty in lawyering,
however, has yet to be developed. Certainly, many lawyers have
engaged in illuminating discussions of various loyalty dilemmas
6. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). Professor Freedman does not
express his justification for these assertions by use of the word "loyalty," but cites the
duty of "entire devotion to the interest of the client" in Canon 15 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics and the Canon 37 duty to "preserve his client's confidences." Id. at
1470. Canon 15 also provides that a lawyer "must obey his own conscience and not that
of his client." See also John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purpose of Advocacy and the Limits of
Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1966).
7. Fried, supra note 5, at 1063-64.
8. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1148, 1161 (1990) ("The same polls that show that the public disrespects lawyers for
their amoral manipulation of the legal system also show that the public values lawyers
for their loyalty and partisanship."). As Professor Subin states:
If, however, lawyers can justify such [arguably wrongful] actions on the
ground that they are in the service of the lofty principle of loyalty, it may
be possible to avoid feelings of guilt, or at least discomfort, over using
distasteful means or providing assistance in the achievement of distasteful
ends. Loyalty is ennobling . ...
Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm,
70 IowA L. REV. 1091, 1171 (1985).
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and of the implications of more or less expansive duties of loyalty
to the client. Usually, however, these discussions offer no signif-
icant inquiry into the nature of loyalty itself. Loyalty is simply
assumed to be essential, in some measure, both in defining the
lawyer-client relation and in assuring that potential clients trust
lawyers enough to buy their services.9
My purpose is to consider the nature of the lawyer's loyalty
obligation itself, drawing on the surprisingly scant treatment of
the concept of loyalty by philosophers and legal writers.10 Loyalty
is a complex concept. Whether it carries moral weight and how
much weight it should be accorded depend substantially on the
circumstances in which the loyalty argument is invoked. For this
reason, an understanding of the lawyer's loyalty obligation will
not resolve all of the dilemmas created by the loyalty principle.
Nevertheless, when loyalty is understood, many of the moral
questions it provokes are brought into sharper focus. For ex-
ample, an understanding of when loyalty claims are valid enables
lawyers to avoid certain moral conundrums. This chance for
avoidance is possible because loyalty to a client, as a moral
obligation of lawyers, is largely contractual in nature-a thesis
this Article develops in detail.
Disloyalty can be expressed in various ways and with various
goals in mind. In particular, lawyers who are disloyal for reasons
of moral compunction- what I call scrupulous disloyalty-can
implement a decision to be disloyal by abandoning the client,
disclosing client confidences, or even lying to the client. More-
over, scrupulous disloyalty by the lawyer can be for the purpose
of either avoiding personal responsibility for the client's wrongful
conduct or defeating the client's wrongful plan. The methods and
goals of disloyalty have played (and must play) an important role
in defining the lawyer's loyalty obligation to a client. Those
9. The relation between loyalty and trust intuitively seems inescapable, although each
may certainly exist without the other. We learn little about loyalty, however, from the
bare knowledge that it often engenders trust. Trust, like loyalty, may seem to be a good
thing, but this observation falls short of a theory of loyalty. More particularly, we still
must discover what loyalty is, whether (or under what conditions) it is good, and what
its necessary limitations are, if any.
10. John Ladd ascribes this scant treatment in the philosophical literature to loyalty's
historical association with obsolete idealist theory and odious political movements such
as Nazism. John Ladd, Loyalty, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILosoPHY 97 (Paul Edwards
ed.. reprint ed. 1972) (1967). Ladd also attributes the lack of philosophical attention to
loyalty to the ascendancy of empiricist and utilitarian theory that denies any distinctive
status to loyalty because it regards the moral status of loyalty as wholly dependent on
its benign or mischievous consequences. I&
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dimensions of loyalty are discussed in this Article as well, with
particular attention given to the crude solutions to loyalty dilem-
mas offered by ethics rules.
The crucial question of whether lawyer disloyalty, in various
forms, is justifiable in particular contexts involves normative
moral considerations that are not, themselves, my immediate
concern. My purpose is to explore the set of moral considerations
that specifically relate to the lawyer's obligation of loyalty to the
client, without determining how those considerations should be
balanced against competing moral considerations in particular
cases. I presume, as do legal ethics rules, that scrupulous
disloyalty to a client is sometimes justified or even required. My
hope is to contribute to an understanding of some of the concerns
that properly influence lawyers' decisions as to the limits of
loyalty owed to a client.
II. THE NATURE OF LOYALTY
Loyalty, as the term is popularly used, is a mixed bag that
includes both petty and profound attachments of wildly varying
strengths. The loyalty that moves martyrs is of a far different
order than the loyalty that prompts a sports fan to root for a
particular team. Still, some characteristics are common to all
loyalties. Loyalty is a term of relation; it must know an object.
It also describes the relation, implying at least a preference for
the object and, perhaps, even a devotion to it. Finally, loyalty
requires action; the preference (or devotion) must be expressed
through conduct.
Most loyalties are essentially social in two respects. First, the
objects of most loyalties can be described in human terms. Loy-
alty to one's family, for example, is directed to the group of
persons who comprise the family. Even loyalty to one's country
is, in large measure, loyalty to one's fellow citizens or to the
national leaders. Second, loyal action generally has consequences
for other people. For example, support for one's country in time
of war has consequences for both fellow citizens and citizens of
the enemy nation. Even loyalty to a sports team is thought to
inspire the athletes being cheered and to discourage their oppo-
nents, a phenomenon contributing to the widely recognized "home
field advantage."
11. See infra notes 179-207 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33:367
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The loyalty of a lawyer toward her client generally is social
with respect to both the client being served and the consequences
of the representation. Even with respect to corporate clients, the
objects of the lawyer's loyalty can be viewed as some or all of
the persons who have a stake in the corporation. 12 Moreover, the
lawyer's loyal action will have consequences for those persons
who are or who stand behind the client and for the client's
adversary, if any, as well.
Loyalty becomes a term of moral discourse when it involves
social action. Its role in moral discourse has been variously
described. Strict utilitarians view loyalty as generating false
moral arguments because, for them, the moral status of loyalty
depends wholly on its consequences. 3 Others argue that loyalty
has independent moral value, but that moral questions cannot be
resolved simply by reference to a loyalty obligation. 14 At the
opposite extreme from utilitarians, some have suggested that
loyalty is an ultimate good or a first principle. 5
The view that loyalty is a first principle seems embedded in
much of the rhetoric of loyalty. Consider Justice Cardozo's famous
dicta in Meinhard v. Salmomn. 16 "the standard of loyalty for those
in trust relations is without the fixed divisions of a graduated
scale" and "'[ulncompromising rigidity' has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the 'rule of un-
divided loyalty' by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular ex-
ceptions."', The work of Josiah Royce, the turn-of-the-century
idealist philosopher whose work has strongly influenced the phil-
osophical discourse on loyalty as a moral value, displayed this
same exuberance: "In loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined,
is the fulfillment of the whole moral law."' 9
12. But see William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 109 (criticizing the idea that one can look behind
corporate clients to regard the lawyer-corporate client relation as a relation with concrete
individuals).
13. See Ladd, supra note 10, at 98 (noting that utilitarians and empiricists find that
loyalty has no special moral significance); Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties, 79 J. PHIL. 173,
180 (1982) ("Utilitarians would argue that our duty is to Humanity and that doing what
benefits your neighborhood or country is wrong if it prevents a greater good for a larger
whole:').
14. See MARCIA BARON, THE MORAL STATUS OF LOYALTY (1984); Ladd, supra note 10, at
98; Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 182-87 (advocating a balancing of the degree of good or
harm at stake against the strength and breadth of the loyalty at issue).
15. See, e.g., Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 180.
16. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
17. Id. at 547.
18. Id. at 546 (quoting Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926)).
19. JOSIAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 15 (1908).
1992]
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The powerful loyalty obligation described by Cardozo and Royce
is understandable only in relation to the proper objects of such
loyalty. Loyalty may be directed to diverse objects, not all of
which justify a strong bond of loyalty. The next three sections
of this Article discuss the possible objects of loyalty, which can
be loosely characterized as consisting of two types: people and
social causes. After discussing each of these types of loyalty, I
conclude this part of the Article with a consideration of the
general role of loyalty in moral decisionmaking.
A. The Objects of Loyalty
Because loyalty must know an object, we are apt to judge the
worthiness of others' loyalties by the objects of their loyalties.
Thus, for example, loyalty to a hateful government that wages
genocidal war against its citizens is apt to earn our scorn. Given
this, how do *we explain that loyalty to a spouse who suffers
from a dread disease that imposes heavy costs upon her family
is apt to win our admiration? The admirable quality lies not in
the ill spouse, but in the loyalty toward her. Indeed, if the ill
spouse were a ne'er-do-well, not particularly deserving of loyalty,
we might consider the loyalty even more admirable. Thus, we
can see that the value of loyalty depends upon its object, but it
does not depend solely upon its object.
Writers have offered two radically different perspectives on
the -proper objects of loyalty. Writing in the early part of the
twentieth century, Royce argued that the only proper objects of
loyalty are causes that have social significance.20 John Ladd and
Andrew Oldenquist, writing more recently, see loyalty as more
fundamentally a relation between persons. 21 These different views
mark an important distinction because loyalty to causes partakes
of an ideal, and loyalty to an ideal may be uncompromising.
Loyalty to persons, however, partakes of the real far more than
of the ideal. Human beings are subject to human frailties, includ-
ing errors of judgment and egocentrism. Uncompromising loyalty
is difficult to defend in the face of such frailties.
The distinction between the objects of loyalty is worth explor-
ing because the strength of the lawyer's loyalty obligation de-
pends upon it. More particularly, if the lawyer's loyalty to a
client involves a more idealized form of loyalty, such as loyalty
* 20. Id. at 20.
21. Ladd, supra note 10, at 97-98; Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 175-82.
[Vol. 33:367
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to the adversary system and the importance of the client's
personal autonomy (that is, arguably worthy causes), one can then
assert the lawyer's loyalty obligation in very powerful terms.
Conversely, if loyalty to a client is, fundamentally, loyalty to
another person, it is subject to greater moral limitations.
Monroe Freedman's spirited defense of the adversarial system
and David Luban's attack upon it, along with Luban's treatment
of both the lawyer and the client as independent moral actors,
suggest the powerful implications of how the lawyer's loyalty
obligation is conceived.H Freedman, for example, after defining
the loyalty obligation in an idealized way, defends a very expan-
sive confidentiality rule and strong client control of the repre-
sentation.P Luban, on the other hand, who describes the lawyer's
loyalty obligation in more personal terms, would significantly
limit the confidentiality rule and emphasizes the importance of
lawyer decisionmaking in the representation.4
It is important, then, to consider the proper objects of loyalty.
Royce viewed loyalty as being properly applied only to a worthy
cause.25 For Royce, a worthy cause is something objective, pos-
sessing value beyond that which the loyal individual attaches to
it. In this respect, worthy causes are somewhat impersonal or
superpersonal. On the other hand, for Royce, a worthy cause is
never wholly impersonal, for it must be social as well.28 It must
be such as to bind two or more persons-such as members of
the family or citizens of the country-into the unity of a single
life.=
22. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
23. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 87. As Freedman states, "The ideal of lawyer-client
trust and confidentiality . . . remains the 'cornerstone of the adversary system and
effective assistance of counsel,' and fidelity to that trust is, indeed, 'the glory of our
profession.'" Id. at 108 (quoting Linton v. Perrini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denid, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982) (holding that trial judge denied a defendant his Sixth
Amendment right to choose counsel) and United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24 (C.C.D. Colo.
1889) (upholding the disbarment of a lawyer for breaching his client's confidences)). "If a
lawyer chooses to represent a client, however, it would be immoral as well as unprofes-
sional for the lawyer, either by concealment or coercion, to deprive the client of lawful
rights that the client elects to pursue after appropriate counseling." Id.
24. LUBAN, supra note 22, at 202-34 (arguing for limits on confidentiality in civil cases
and in the representation of large or bureaucratic organizational clients). Luban further
suggests "that rules be redrafted to allow lawyers to forego immoral tactics or the
pursuit of unjust ends without withdrawing, even if their clients insist that they use
these tactics or pursue these ends." Id. at 159.
25. ROYCE, supra note 19, at 18-19.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id at 107.
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Loyalty, for Royce, has a social aspect to it, for it seeks to
unite persons to a common cause.2 It is never "merely a relation
of one individual to other individuals."' Loyalty between people
is not properly characterized as an attachment to one another
but rather as a devotion to the tie that binds them, to their
unity, "which is something more than either of them, or even
than both of them viewed as distinct individuals."' 0 Loyalty to
the ill spouse, in Royce's view, would not be to the person of the
spouse, but to the tie that binds the couple together, to the
marriage and the promises and expectations it entails31 Loyalty
to another individual cannot give one's life a guiding purpose,
which is a central feature of loyalty according to Royce.3 Only
objects that serve the quest for the good are worthy of the life
devotion required by Royce's form of loyalty.
The notion of a weak loyalty, one that might be legitimately
betrayed, seemed unacceptably paradoxical to Royce.3 Weak
loyalties do involve a paradox: loyalty supposes fidelity to its
object; weak loyalty supposes limited fidelity. Limited fidelity
may be oxymoronic. Loyalty, by its very nature, could be an
absolute term that becomes incoherent, in Cardozo's words, under
"the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions."' '
Contemporary writers are less troubled by the seeming para-
dox of limited loyalty and are less inclined to find that loyalty
is properly given only to idealized causes. John Ladd,s Andrew
Oldenquist,m and Marcia Baron3 assert that Royce's prescription
of loyalty to causes more accurately describes devotion to ideals,
not "loyalty," as the term is commonly used. To these writers,
"loyalty" involves a possessive attachment to real objects, usually
people or groups of people, not to ideals. Baron explains the
distinction:
[L]oyalties involve an ineliminable first-person (possessive) pro-
noun: "my" (or "our"). This means that I can only be loyal to
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id. at 226.
30. Id at 20.
31. See i(.
32. Id. at 42.
33. I& at 30-38.
34. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting Wendt v. Fischer, 154
N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
35. Ladd, supra note 10, at 97.
36. Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 175.
37. BARON, supra note 14.
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my X, but more importantly that to be loyal to my X, I must
think of it under the description "my X" rather than merely
as an X which has the qualities a, b, and c. The reason is that
otherwise I am committed to a kind of X, not to this X. If I
am committed to a kind of X but not to some particular X,
then I do not yet have any reason for preferring my X to
other X's of the same kind. And yet if I am loyal to my X
(e.g., my country), I do . . . prefer it or value it more than
other X's of the same kind (e.g., other democratic countries).8
Not surprisingly, Ladd, Oldenquist, and Baron -reject Royce's
assumption that loyalty, to be coherent, must be uncompromising.
Ladd asserts that loyalties naturally come into conflicts in which
one loyalty must be favored over another. 9 Oldenquist believes
that "each loyalty determines obligations only prima facie. '40
Baron generally concludes that "claims of loyalty are overridden
by duties of justice." 41
While Royce characterized too narrowly the possible objects
of loyalty, the contemporary writers suffer from the same flaw.
Loyalty to an ideal aptly describes the conduct of individuals
who steadily work in support of a cause but do so through
changing friendships and organizational affiliations.4 2 Loyalty to
a cause may differ from loyalty to people and other real objects,
not because one is loyalty and the other is not, but because
loyalty to a cause may be uncompromising in a way that loyalty
to people cannot be.
B. Loyalty to a Cause
One of the central problems of loyalty to any object is whether
it subjugates personal autonomy in an unacceptable way. Stated
differently, the problem is whether we can be free (and respon-
38. Id, at 4.
39. Ladd, supra note 10, at 98.
40. Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 182. Oldenquist continues:
As in any case of conflicting normative considerations, sometimes a person
will judge his family or national obligations to take precedence over wider
societal obligations and sometimes he will not. It depends, among other
things, on how much is at stake in each domain, on the possibility of a given
action satisfying both loyalties to differing degrees, and on the 'strengths'
of the loyalties themselves.
Id. at 187.
41. BARON, supra note 14, at 25.
42. Che Guevara, Dr. David Livingstone, and Moses Malone are examples that come
to mind.
1992]
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sible) moral actors and be loyal at the same time. Royce recog-
nized that, having decided on a cause deserving of loyalty, "[hiaving
surrendered the self to the chosen special cause,"' 4 one owes a
duty of fidelity to the cause. He likened loyalty to an "ethical
marriage" 44 that prohibits one from "turning back from the cause
once chosen." 45 To some very great extent, Royce's loyalty locks
one into a course of behavior.
Notwithstanding this lock, Royce claimed that "[t]he only way
to be practically autonomous is to be freely loyal."4 Autonomy,
in Royce's view, is found in the freedom to choose the causes
worthy of one's loyalty. No one can impose upon us a cause to
which we are bound to be loyal. 47 Absent the autonomous choice
of a cause, the fidelity demanded of loyalty would be impossible.
Thus, although loyalty may be a lock, it is a lock we freely place
upon ourselves, so that even as we choose our lock, we express
our autonomy.
Royce's rejection of the paradox of limited loyalty creates the
risk of being morally bound to do, for the sake of loyalty to a
cause, apparently immoral acts. A cause, however morally wor-
thy, sometimes may require conduct that seems morally wrong.
Royce contemplated this dilemma and devised a solution that
brought him right back into the paradox of limited loyalty: "Only
a growth in knowledge which makes it evident that the special
cause once chosen is an unworthy cause . . . only such a growth
in knowledge can absolve from fidelity to the cause once cho-
sen."
48
If, at any given time, loyalty to a cause seems worthy, it is
because our universe of then-known facts seems to make it so.
As our knowledge grows, Royce recognized that we may learn
facts that require our betrayal of causes to which we had pre-
viously been loyal.49 The close relationship between knowledge
and worthy loyalty is apparent. As Royce acknowledged, "[tiruth
seeking and loyalty are therefore essentially the same process of
life merely viewed in two different aspects."5
43. ROYcE, supra note 19, at 190.
44. Id. at 191.
45. Id. at 190.
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id. at 120. "My cause cannot be merely forced upon me. It is I who make it my
own. . . .However much the cause may seem to be assigned to me by my social station,
I must cooperate in the choice of the cause, before the act of loyalty is complete." Id.
48. Id. at 191.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 314.
[Vol. 33:367
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Even loyalty to an ideal is subject to legitimate betrayal.
Loyalty is an imperfect moral force; it is undertaken with limited
knowledge, and unanticipated countervailing moral forces some-
times may outweigh it. This observation does not deny the
importance of loyalty, especially to a cause well-chosen; it simply
recognizes that we have few moral absolutes in this world, and
loyalty is not among them.
Monroe Freedman's recent work suggests a Roycian loyalty to
causes, upon which Freedman carefully constructs a theory of
legal ethics. 1 Freedman's causes are the adversary system5 2 and
client dignity and autonomy under the lawP Out of loyalty to
these causes, Freedman develops a powerful duty of loyalty to
the client.
Recognizing that loyalty to his causes is an imperfect moral
force, Freedman notes several significant limitations to that loy-
alty. He holds a lawyer morally accountable for the particular
clients and causes the lawyer chooses to represent.s He also
suggests requiring the lawyer "to reveal confidences to the
minimum extent necessary to avoid death or serious (i.e., life-
threatening) bodily harm."' In addition, he implicitly supports
prohibitions on threatening criminal charges, making gifts or
loans to judges, ex parte communications, and some other tradi-
tional limits on zealous advocacy.0
In sum, Freedman, like Royce, regards loyalty, when properly
directed, as a powerful moral force. Even so, Freedman recognizes
that limits to its power exist and that in some circumstances,
such as when human life is at stake, more powerful moral forces
overtake loyalty. People may disagree as to the limits of loyalty,
but it does have limits, even when it is most powerfully defined
in terms of loyalty to an ideal cause.
51. FREEDMAN, supra note 22.
52. Id. at 13-42 ("[Tlhe available evidence suggests that the adversary system is the
method of dispute resolution that is most effective in determining truth, that gives the
parties the greatest sense of having received justice, and that is most successful in
fulfilling other social goals as well.").
53. Id. at 43-64 ("One of the essential values of a just society is respect for the dignity
of each member of that society. Essential to each individual's dignity is the free exercise
of his autonomy.").
54. Id. at 50 ("Once the lawyer has chosen to accept responsibility to represent a client,
however, the zealousness of that representation cannot be tempered by the lawyer's
moral judgments of the client or of the client's cause.").
55. Id. at 66-70.
56. Id. at 103.
57. See, e.g., id, at 82-86.
19921
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C. Loyalty to People
If loyalties to ideal causes necessarily admit of legitimate
betrayal, then loyalties to people (who rarely approach the ideal)
presumably are subject to similar limitations. Therefore, in com-
pelling circumstances and for sufficient cause, we may be morally
required to betray our lovers, children, parents, friends, and
clients. An extreme illustration will prove the point because if
betrayal of those to whom we are most loyal is ever legitimate,
then the limited nature of the loyalty obligation to persons is
generally established. All that remains is to work out the circum-
stances in which disloyalty is legitimate.
First, consider an extreme illustration: A parent's adult child
suffers from a serious mental illness exhibited by homicidal
behavior. The child has killed often, and the parent believes the
child will continue killing until she is captured and restrained.
The child wants to be free to continue killing. The parent dis-
closes the child's whereabouts to the police, who capture and
restrain the child. Has the parent been disloyal to the child? If
so, is this disloyalty justifiable?
The parent's conduct certainly seems morally legitimate. The
child is committing grave wrongs. Innocent people are suffering
at the child's hands, and more suffering will occur unless the
parent acts. The parent's moral choice to value the lives of
innocent people over the freedom of her child seems unassailable
in this context.
Whether the parent's conduct is disloyal is the more perplexing
question, particularly because loyalty to people often involves
the difficult problem of paternalism. The parent may conclude
that she acted for the child's own good, even though the child
may not see it that way. If the question of disloyalty is assessed
from the child's present perspective, the parent's conduct may
appear to be disloyal. If the question is assessed from the parent's
paternalistic perspective, the conduct may appear to be loyal;
the parent has concluded that she is acting in the child's best
interests as well as in the public interest.
Paternalism can be used to justify almost any form of disloyalty
to people prompted by moral scruples. If the paternalism excuse
works-that is, if loyalty is measured by my judgment of what
is best for you rather than by your judgment-legitimate betrayal
prompted by moral scruples may be a superfluous concept. This
follows from the premise that doing what is morally right is best
for each of us in the long run. If conduct is in your best interests,
how can it be disloyal?
378 [Vol. 33:367
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When paternalistic conduct, viewed as loyal by the actor but
disloyal by the object, enforces the actor's moral judgment, the
conduct is described best in Roycian terms as being loyal to
truth and the good rather than loyal to the person who is the
object of the conduct. Thus, the paternalistic loyalty excuse, when
employed in the enforcement of the actor's moral judgment, is
not loyalty to people but loyalty to a cause, in the Roycian sense.
For this reason, the parent who discloses the whereabouts of her
mentally ill and dangerous child on the basis of a moral judgment
is not being loyal to her child, even if she believes that her child
will benefit from her conduct.
This conclusion does not dispose completely of the paternalism
problem with loyalty to people. Paternalistic loyalty does not
always involve moral scruples. A soccer coach may give the game
ball to another child on the team rather than to her own child,
who played the best game, not because she wants to be fair, but
because she wants to encourage her child to play harder in the
next game. In her child's view, the coach may have been disloyal.
In the coach's view, she has been loyal to her child by watching
out for her long-term interests. In any event, the coach's action
is not prompted by moral scruples.
Similarly, the parent of the mentally ill and dangerous child
may turn in her child so that the child receives medical or
psychological treatment. The parent may not weigh heavily the
moral claims of innocent victims in deciding on her course of
action. The parent may honestly believe that she is being loyal
to her child, not to her sense of right and wrong independent of
her child's best interests. Has she, then, acted loyally to her
child, even though her child, knowing all the facts, does not
believe she has?
Loyalty to people entails the critical interpretive problem of
deciding from whose perspective one should view the conduct.
Conduct that appears disloyal to the object may be loyal from
the perspective of the actor. Moreover, different information
possessed by the actor and object may lead to different beliefs
concerning the loyalty of the actor's conduct. Loyalty to people
is bilateral; it involves both a duty on the actor and a claim by
the object.
If loyalty is viewed from the object's perspective and pater-
nalistic standards are disallowed, the actor may confront the
dilemma that loyalty to a person requires conduct that the actor
believes is not in the person's best interests. Loyalty, as thus
defined, may require the actor to harm intentionally the object's
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interests, albeit at the object's direction or with her consent.
Loyalty in this form, carried to its extreme, requires instanta-
neous responses to the most recently expressed desire of the
object. Not only does this deny the autonomy of the actor, it
misaligns the very relationships that ordinarily inspire meaning-
ful loyalty, such as family bonds and friendships.ee
It would serve no useful purpose to define loyalty exclusively
in terms of either the actor's or object's perspective while re-
jecting the other perspective. The actor's motivation to be loyal
is important, as is the object's sense of betrayal. Neither reality
can be obliterated by defining loyalty in some particular way.
Conduct will be viewed from different perspectives, and, at times,
the assessment of whether the conduct is loyal or disloyal will
turn more on the perspective than on anything inherent in the
conduct.
The problem with paternalistic loyalty is the problem with
paternalism generally. Paternalism, which we may define in Dun-
can Kennedy's terms as overruling a person's choice in their own
best interest, 9 denies autonomy and dignity to its object. When
loyalty is involved, loyal service to another is transformed by
paternalism into control over another.
Paternalistic loyalty is especially troubling in the lawyer's role,
in which concern for the autonomy and dignity of the client is
the principal justification for that role.60 Not surprisingly, legal
ethics rules generally prohibit the lawyer's paternalistic control
of the representation, unless the client is under a disability of
some sort, and even then the rules are ambiguous.61 Thus, ethics
58. See P.S. Atiyah, Contract as a Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, 95
HARV. L. REV. 509, 527 (1981) (book review) ("The proposition that a person is always the
best judge of his own interests is a good starting point for laws and institutional
arrangements, but as an infallible empirical proposition it is an outrage to human
experience.").
59. The definition is taken from Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives
in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 572 (1982). Kennedy suggests that his definition
may be too limited, that paternalism may also involve forms of intervention in the lives
of others that do not consist of "overruling" the other's choices. For purposes of the
present discussion of loyalty, however, the definition is adequately descriptive.
60. See, e.g., infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 57;
LUBAN, supra note 22, at 85-87.
61. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1989) (stating that the client
determines the objectives of the representation and should be consulted as to means);
id. Rule 1.14 (concerning client under a disability). But see generally David Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454 (discussing circumstances in
which a lawyer can justify her paternalistic actions toward a client).
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rules legislate a required resp6nse to the problem of paternalistic
loyalty, but this does not make the problem go away. Rather,
the rules simply direct lawyers to live with the guilt of harming
their clients by acceding to their clients' self-destructive wishes.
Let me conclude this discussion of paternalism with three
observations: first, moral judgments that override the object's
choice for the actor's conduct may be couched in terms of pater-
nalistic loyalty but more plausibly reflect a Roycian loyalty to
the good; second, paternalistic actions, which appear disloyal to
the object, cannot be categorically defined as either loyal or
disloyal because the issue more accurately involves the justifi-
cation for paternalism than the justification for (dis)loyalty to the
person; third, disloyalty to people sometimes has nothing to do
with paternalism. An actor may be disloyal for good reasons or
bad, which, in any event, may be conceived in nonpaternalistic
terms.
Loyalty to people involves a second complication in addition
to paternalism: the problem of disparities of information between
actor and object. The actor and the object may either agree or
disagree as to whether the actor's conduct was loyal to the
object. Disagreement as to the actor's (dis)loyalty may result
from differences in perspective or information. In some cases of
disagreement, if the parties had the same information, they would
agree as to the (dis)loyalty of the actor's conduct. By the same
token, there may be instances of mistaken agreement, for ex-
ample, in which the object agrees that the actor's conduct was
loyal, but if the object knew all of the facts, she would no longer
agree.
Information disparities can cause parties to form a poorly
founded-and, perhaps, transient-belief as to the actor's
(dis)loyalty. As with paternalism, the problem of information
disparities is not, strictly speaking, a loyalty problem, and it is
unlikely to be resolved by loyalty theory. More realistically,
loyalty theory must wend its way around the problems of pater-
nalism and information disparities without resolving them. Nev-
ertheless, these problems are endemic in loyalties to people.
The lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client is often conceived in
terms of loyalty to a person, rather than to a cause or ideal. As
Charles Wolfram notes, "[T]he client-lawyer relationship is an
intensely personal one,"62 which explains the general freedom of
62. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 147.
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lawyers to determine whether to undertake the representation
of a particular client. David Luban's criticism of the attorney-
client privilege as applied to bureaucratic organizations3 and his
relaxed standards of confidentiality in civil suits" also suggest
that loyalty to a client can be conceived in highly personal terms.
The strict dichotomy between loyalty to causes and loyalty to
people generally dissolves in discussions of the lawyer's loyalty
obligation to a client. The lawyer's loyalty springs from both
personal and institutional sources, which combine to make the
lawyer's loyalty obligation powerful. At the same time, the law-
yer's loyalty obligation, like all loyalties, is not so powerful as to
override all competing concerns in all cases.
D. Loyalty as an Organizing Principle
Royce saw loyalty as providing structure and meaning to an
active life. Andrew Oldenquist, although rejecting much of Royce's
theory, shares Royce's view that loyalty is a pivotal concept in
positively shaping the individual and society.65 Loyalty, in Old-
enquist's view, involves shared ownership66 If I am loyal to
something, I regard it as mine, whether it is my family, my
clients, my community, my law school, or my country. For most
loyalties, others may regard the same object as theirs. When
numerous people are loyal to the same object, it becomes ours,
a shift "of the greatest moment" 67 because a community is thereby
defined.
Oldenquist sees loyalty as being different from, but sharing
features with, both egoism and impersonal morality:
Loyalty is neither egoism nor impersonal morality. It is not
self-interested, because people can sacrifice, in the name of
loyalty, their happiness and even their lives, and it probably
is this element of potential self-sacrifice that makes most people
classify motives of loyalty as moral motives. Moreover, reasons
of loyalty have a general appeal among members of a society
63. LUBAN, supra note 22, at 232 ("The argument that the privilege is necessary for
the sake of human dignity fails because a corporation is not a human being.").
64. Id at 202-05 ("[Ilt is absurd ... to argue that forcing the civil defendant to choose
between lying and revealing facts that indicate that she indeed owes compensation
affronts her human dignity more than permitting her to preserve her honor by eluding
a just judgment affronts the human dignity of her victim.").
65. See Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 174-77.
66. See id. at 175-76.
67. Id. at 176.
382 [Vol. 33:367
LAWYERS AND LOYALTY
whereas a self-interested reason appeals only to the agent. But
neither is loyalty impersonal morality, since an obligation of
loyalty depends on viewing a thing as one's own. In terms of
the logic of the reasons they provide, loyalties are a third
category of the normative, distinct from both self-interest and
impersonal morality.P
Because the object of loyalty is viewed as a noninstrumental
good, group loyalties can establish moral communities in which
the common good is defined as the flourishing of the object of
loyalty, and, consequently, the flourishing of the group that
shares the loyalty. Within these moral communities, Oldenquist
finds that standards of impersonal morality operate to protect
impartially the members, at least in respect to their investment
in the loyally defined common good.69
Group loyalties are especially relevant to feelings of alienation,
according to Oldenquist. 70 Oldenquist defines alienation in terms
of the absence of an expected sense of loyalty.71 One is alienated
from her community, in Oldenquist's view, if she does not regard
it as her own and does not much care what happens to it or
what it looks like.72 In this sense, group loyalty is the opposite
of alienation, and group loyalties can produce benefits to the
individual and the group just as alienation produces correspond-
ing harms to the individual and, potentially, the group. Olden-
quist, like Royce, thus finds that certain loyalties' such as to the
68. Id.
69. See i. Aristotle made a similar point:
For in every community-between every set of persons who are united by a
common objective or a common interest-there is commonly held to be some
form of justice-some specific conduct that is just, in that the members have
the right to expect such conduct of each other . . . Popular opinion and
popular practice, then, seem to show that friendship and justice are both found
between any and every set of persons who are united in a community.
..[The object and the closeness of the community between any set of
persons determines the extent and the nature of the rules which govern their
conduct toward each other, and we may therefore conclude that it will determine
the closeness of the bond of friendship which exists between them. The proverb
which says "the property of friends is common" is right: for friendship can
only exist between those who are in a community of some sort-i.e. between
those who have something in common.
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOKS VIII & IX 51-52 (Geoffrey Percival trans.,
Aristotle on Friendship 1940) (emphasis in original, indicating translator's explanation)
(footnote omitted).
70. Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 187-91.
71. See id. at 187-88.
72. Id. at 187.
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community, should be actively encouraged because of the good
they can do.73
Oldenquist recognizes that one may hold many group loyalties,
which may be thought of as radiating in ever-larger concentric
circles from the individual.74 The point at the center of the circles
is oneself, and, moving out, we can locate such loyalties as family,
neighborhood, community, country, and species. 75
Loyalties may come into conflict. An expressway that is good
for my community may be bad for my neighborhood, and a tax
credit that is bad for my country may be good for my family. In
Oldenquist's view, neither wider nor narrower loyalties always
takes precedence over the other.76 This observation is true, in
large part, because good and harm come in degrees: it is possible
that a small harm to my family will produce a large benefit to
my country, but it is equally possible that a small benefit to my
country will produce a large harm to my family.77 Loyalties
contribute to moral equations such as these, but they do not
always resolve them.78
Loyalty, then, can be an organizing principle for moral deci-
sionmaking in the sense that many moral issues often require a
choice between loyalties. Choosing between loyalties involves a
form of cost-benefit analysis in which the greatest good for the
greatest number is a factor, but not the rule.79 The loyalty
dilemmas that lawyers face are often of this sort, in that loyalty
to a client may require disloyalty to the lawyer's family, com-
munity, or nation. General loyalty principles do not categorically
resolve these dilemmas. Rather, loyalty dilemmas must be re-
73. See id. at 191-93. The key to developing community loyalty, according to Oldenquist,
is to make the community different, in a positive way, from other communities. Differ-
entiating features that make our community better are essential to our thinking the
community is ours. Oldenquist suggests that architecture and public art can help do this.
74. Id. at 179-80.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 179-82.
77. See id. at 182.
78. Aristotle noted that "unjust conduct is accounted the more unjust, the closer the
tie of friendship which binds the parties together." ARISTOTLE, supra note 69, at 52. If
"loyalty" is substituted for "friendship" in this observation, it supports Oldenquist's point
that wider loyalties do not always take precedence over narrower loyalties, because
narrower loyalties, such as to one's family, often involve closer ties. At the same time,
Aristotle asserted the preeminence of the "political community," at least in relation to
communities "formed for nothing more than the pleasure of their members." Id at 55
(emphasis in original, indicating translator's explanation). It seems unlikely that Aristotle
would regard the family in this light. See id at 24.
79. Oldenquist, supra note 13, at 180-82.
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solved through a complex moral assessment, in which loyalty
concerns figure prominently but consequences must be considered
as well.
Thus, moral questions often are resolved by an assessment of
the strength of the loyalties at stake and the good or harm that
is done to each of the competing objects of loyalty by acting in
a particular way. Loyalties to individual clients and to the insti-
tutional role of the lawyer (however that role is defined) are
likely to be relatively strong loyalties, but this concept speaks
to only one part of the equation. The other part of the equation
consists of the consequences of any contemplated course of action.
Monroe Freedman, for example, recognizes both of these di-
mensions of moral reasoning in concluding that a lawyer should
divulge client confidences to the minimum extent necessary to
save a human life.8 For Freedman, although loyalty to a client
should be very strong, it is not as strong as his commitment to
the sanctity of life, a value that is "of unique importance."'' He
justifies this priority by explaining that "the occasions on which
a lawyer's divulgence of a client's confidence is the only thing
that stands between human life and death are so rare that a
requirement of divulgence would pose no threat to the systemic
value of lawyer-client trust."8' 2
In other words, Freedman first addresses the moral question
of whether loyalty to a client or the sanctity of life deserves the
greater commitment. He then assesses the harm that is done to
the institutional value of lawyer-client trust by preferring the
sanctity of life over loyalty to the client. Freedman's analysis
implies that if divulging confidences to save a life would pose a
serious "threat to the systemic value of lawyer-client trust,"3 he
might reverse his view on the morality of such divulgence.
Deontological and utilitarian concerns are melded in this form
of moral decisionmaking. The values at stake and the conse-
quences of a particular course of action must both be weighed in
determining proper conduct. For this reason, categorical prefer-
ences for one value (or loyalty) over another are of limited use
because they ignore the consequences of proposed conduct in
particular circumstances.
80. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 102.
81. Id-
82. Id. at 102-03.
83. Id.
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III. REASONS FOR THE LAWYER'S LOYALTY OBLIGATION
Part II of this Article developed certain themes about loyalty.
In particular, loyalty is a term of relation, and the possible objects
of loyalty are both people and causes. The moral value of loyalty
has also been discussed, in a preliminary way, with the conclusion
that a theory of uncompromising loyalty that is not subject to
legitimate betrayal has not been persuasively advanced. Thus,
loyalties may be legitimately betrayed if the proper circum-
stances are present. Nevertheless, the value of loyalty has been
defended, and this defense includes the claim that the value of
loyalty depends partially, but not solely, on the value of its
object.
This Part of the Article expands upon the justifications for
the lawyer's loyalty obligation to clients. The first section adopts
a Roycian approach in which lawyers may measure their loyalty
obligations in relation to a professional ideal. The second section
considers Charles Fried's theory of the lawyer's loyalty obliga-
tion, based on a friendship analogy and a concern for client
dignity and autonomy. The third section advances a contract
theory of the lawyer's loyalty obligation. Finally, the fourth
section of this Part addresses certain efficiency concerns under-
lying the lawyer's loyalty obligation. These discussions lay the
groundwork for identifying the limits of the lawyer's loyalty
obligation.
A. Loyalty to a Professional Ideal
The traditional notion of a profession as an occupation pursued
"in the spirit of public service" 84 is a social cause, in the sense
that Royce uses the term, that could inspire loyalty. Indeed,
Royce illustrates the concept of loyalty at work in a profession
by describing how a loyal judge would decide a case:
Were I a loyal judge on the bench, whose cause was my official
function, then my judicial conscience would be simply my whole
ideal as a judge, when this ideal was contrasted with any of
my present and narrower views of the situation directly before
84. See Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) [hereinafter
Report of the Commission on Professionalism] (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAR
ASSOCIATIONS 5 (1953)).
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me. If, at a given moment, I tended to lay unfair stress upon
one side of a controversy that had been brought into my court,
my ideal would say: But a judge is impartial. If I were disposed
to decide with inadvised haste, the ideal would say: But a
judge takes account of the whole law bearing on the case. If I
were offered bribes, my judicial conscience would reject them
as being once for all ideally intolerable. In order to have such
a judicial conscience, I should, of course, have to -be able to
view my profession as the carrying out of some one purpose,
and so as one cause. This purpose I should have learned, of
course, from the traditions of the office. But I should have had
willingly to adopt these traditions as my own, and to conceive
my own life in terms of them, in order to have a judicial
conscience of my own.5
Similarly, lawyers may be guided by a professional ideal in which
loyalties to the client, the legal system, and the community are
component parts.
In developing a professional* ideal, lawyers can envision a
proper balance of the conflicting loyalties to which they will be
subject in their work. Ethics rules exemplify a formal effort to
do just that, and much legal scholarship is, of course, properly
devoted to the same purpose.
Thus, a professional ideal can help us identify our loyalties as
lawyers and gauge the strength of each such loyalty. A profes-
sional ideal can even propose certain moral priorities, such as
whether the preservation of life or the discovery of truth is
generally more important than loyalty to a client. The difficulty
with formulations of any professional ideal, however, is that the
balance of loyalties cannot properly be determined, once and for
all, without considering the consequences of conduct in particular
circumstances. Because good and bad come in degrees, we cannot
know how a conflict in loyalties should be resolved without
knowing the circumstances in which we must prefer one loyalty
over another. This is not because consequences finally determine
conflicts of loyalties, but because consequences influence the
determination, along with the relative strengths of the loyalties
in conflict.
Monroe Freedman's conclusion that the preservation of life is
more important than loyalty to a clientm provides a useful illus-
tration. If any categorical moral priority makes sense, it is the
85. RoycE, supra note 19, at 174-75.
86. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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value of preserving human life. From this premise, Freedman
concludes that client confidences should be divulged to the min-
imum extent necessary to prevent a death, even though the
death will not result from criminal conduct by the client.8
Suppose that, to prevent a death, the lawyer must put her
client's life at risk. Suppose further that the client is an under-
cover police officer who discloses to her lawyer that a criminal
group she infiltrated planned to assassinate an extremely dan-
gerous member of the group. Should the lawyer disclose this
plan knowing that the client will inescapably be placed at serious
risk if the disclosure is made? What if the consequences of the
disclosure are not that the client's life will be placed at risk but
that the undercover assignment will be blown and the chance for
building a case against a group of deadly criminals will be lost?
For me, these difficult questions lead to this conclusion: even
the most clear-cut moral priorities can lose their force in unan-
ticipated and extraordinary circumstances. The purpose of this
conclusion is not to deny the worth of establishing moral priorities
when constructing a professional ideal; its purpose is only to
recognize the limits of the enterprise.
David Luban implicitly recognizes the limited usefulness of
priorities for moral values when he proposed categorical restric-
tions on the partisan zeal of lawyers, including restrictions:
(1) on modes of practice that inflict morally unjustifiable dam-
age on other people, especially innocent people;
(2) on deceit, i.e., actions that obscure truths or that lure people
into doing business under misapprehensions, even if these are
legally permissible;
(3) on manipulations of morally defensible law to achieve out-
comes that negate its generality or violate its spirit; and, in
general,
(4) on the pursuit of substantively unjust results.P
These restrictions are morally sensible in the abstract and
suggest moral concerns that are entitled to great weight in a
lawyer's choice of professional action. The moral weight of the
loyalty obligation is presumptively inferior, in Luban's view, to
the weight of the moral concerns expressed in these restrictions.8 9
Luban recognizes, however, that these moral priorities establish
87. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 102-03.
88. LUBAN, supra note 22, at 157.
89. Id.
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only presumptions; he recognizes that when an "extraordinary
justification" exists, a lawyer may legitimately act loyally toward
the client and disregard the suggested restriction. °
Luban's caution in offering moral guidance for all time and in
all circumstances is well-placed. Unanticipated circumstances can
change the moral equation. Again, this caution should not lead
to a blanket condemnation of the prescriptive moral principles
advanced by a professional ideal but only to a recognition of
their limitations.
B. Loyalty and Client Autonomy
If generalities captured in a professional ideal cannot resolve
adequately all of the loyalty dilemmas that lawyers may confront,
perhaps a better understanding of the source of loyalty within
the lawyer-client relation can. This approach, in any event, was
Charles Fried's project. Rather than proceeding from the stan-
dard of the ideal professional, Fried adopts the standard of the
good man, not the saint, to measure professional conduct. Fried's
standard is "moral sufficiency," 91 not moral perfection. For the
person whose conduct is morally sufficient, Fried asserts that
one should neither condemn nor compel another to do more, even
though much more could be done 2
Fried's scaled-down version of moral conduct permits him to
establish norms of conduct that, within prescribed limits, do not
allow exceptions. Fried's norms, which he characterized as "cat-
egorical norms" that entail "limited absolutism," 93 absolutely for-
bid acts that intentionally produce certain specified wrongs 4
Fried defines "intention" to include only results "chosen either
as one's ultimate end or as one's means to that end."95
With this formula of limited absolutes to guide him,96 Fried
advances a theory of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to a client that
90. Id.
91. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 194 (1978).
92. Id-
93. Id. at 9-13.
94. Among the wrongs Fried identifies are physically harming and lying to another.
Fried carefully outlines the contours of how and when such conduct is wrong. Id.
95. Id. at 22.
96. The use of the term "absolute" has its problems, although it is the term that Fried
uses. The categories of wrongs to which Fried's absolute prohibitions attach have fuzzy
edges, as do the requirements of action and intent. Moreover, the absolute prohibitions
do not apply in catastrophic or trivial situations, adding more fuzzy edges. The paradox
of absolutes with fuzzy edges is inherent in all deontological regimes.
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justifies the knowing assistance of a lawyer in some legal, but
morally wrongful, conduct by the client. Stated differently, Fried
concludes that a lawyer may be morally required, in certain
circumstances, to assist in a client's intentional commission of a
moral wrong. Thus, Fried advances a loyalty theory that values
loyalty independently, apart from the moral consequences of the
lawyer's conduct.
Fried reaches this expansive duty of loyalty to the client by
pursuing the premise that, in a reasonably just society, an indi-
vidual has rights, among which is "the right not to be subjected
to legal constraints except in accordance with duly enacted and
applied rules of law." 97 Moreover, the existence of these rights
implies, to Fried, an entitlement for individuals "to learn what
their rights are and to assert those rights." If it is morally good
that people have rights and the autonomy to assert them, then
it is morally good, in Fried's view, for the lawyer to advise the
client of her rights and assist her in asserting them. If the client
is morally wrong in asserting particular legal rights in particular
circumstances, that is not the lawyer's responsibility. The lawyer
has intended only to assist her client in exercising her rights,
which is morally good; the lawyer has not intended, in the sense
that Fried defines that term, the harmful consequences that
follow.
Fried distinguishes between "wrongs that a reasonably just
legal system permits to be worked by its rules and wrongs which
the lawyer commits himself." The former wrongs are those that
the law not only permits "but specifies the details by which the
result is reached. Your conduct as a lawyer is efficacious only
insofar as legal institutions have created the occasion for it. What
you do is not personal; it is a formal, legally defined act."'10
Wrongs of this sort include "using the defense that a contract
was not put in writing or that the suit was brought too late and
so defeating what you know to be a just claim against your
client."'10 1 Similarly, the lawyer acting on the client's behalf may
"pursue socially noxious schemes, foreclose the mortgages of
widows or orphans, or assist in the avoidance of just punish-
ment,"'10 2 again, in Fried's view, without acting immorally.
97. FRIED, supra note 91, at 181.
98. Id. at 182.
99. Id at 191.
100. Id. at 192.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 191.
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Conversely, wrongs for which Fried does not absolve the law-
yer involve offenses against the victim's integrity as a rational
moral being. More particularly, these offenses are not peculiarly
permitted by law, so that the moral quality of such acts "obtains
without and within the context of law."'03 Wrongs of this sort
include telling lies and humiliating witnesses. 10 4 Fried asserts
that these are wrongs that cannot be done solely in a represen-
tative capacity: "[I]t is like stabbing someone in the back 'just'
in a representative capacity. The injury and betrayal are not
worked by the legal process, but by an act which is generally
harmful quite apart from the legal context in which it occurs."'10 5
Fried distinguishes, therefore, "between the lawyer's own wrong
and the wrong of the system on which the client chooses to
rely."' 6 He concludes that: "[tihe lawyer is not morally entitled,
therefore, to engage his own person in doing personal harm to
another, though he may work the system for his client even if
the system then works injustice."'0 7 Fried does not merely absolve
the lawyer for assisting in the client's intentional wrong pursuant
to a legal right; he requires the lawyer to provide this assistance,
if the lawyer undertook to represent the client. The assistance
given the wrongdoing client is demanded of the lawyer by an
"iron requirement of loyalty."'"8 Fried does not expand upon the
moral foundations of the requirement of loyalty, except to de-
scribe the client as a limited-purpose friend who is "entitled to
all the special consideration within the limits of the relationship
which we accord to a friend or loved one."'1 9
Fried's loyalty theory, then, depends in part upon an analogy
between the roles of lawyer and friend. Through his friendship
analogy, he transforms permissible conduct in aid of a client into
required conduct. Fried offers this "classic definition of friend-
ship": "he acts in your interests, not his own; or rather he adopts
your interests as his own."" 0 Having once undertaken this strong
bond of limited friendship, the lawyer is captive to the client's
interests, for "it is the client's needs which hold the reins-
legally and morally."'
103. Id at 192.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 192-93.
106. Id. at 192.
107. Id at 193.
108. Id. at 168.
109. Fried, supra note 5, at 1071.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Fried does not explore the nature of the loyalty duty in
friendships. In fact, he displays some ambivalence as to the scope
of the duty. He describes the duty, at one point, as an "iron
requirement" 112 without which there is in fact nothing to the
relation beyond what the instantaneous application of justice and
efficiency requires.113 Yet, at other points, Fried speaks more
modestly of loyalty as giving a "kind of preference, special
consideration, or extra measure of care" 114 to the friend.
His friendship analogy to the lawyer's loyalty obligation to a
client is flawed by the extravagant claim that he makes in his
"classic definition of friendship." Does friendship really involve
adopting the friend's interests as one's own, even when the friend
defines her interest as requiring the commission of a moral
wrong? Do we believe that our friends' interests are ever mean-
ingfully served by their commission of moral wrongs? It may be
paternalistic, but it seems more plausible that friends are most
loyal by steering one another toward fulfillment of their moral
obligations, not breach of them, and certainly not by assisting
them in their wrongdoing.
Fried's analogy of the lawyer-client relation to friendship does
not work. Fried attempts to strengthen the lawyer-client bond
by analogizing it to friendship, but then he calls upon lawyers to
do for clients what they would not do for real friends- actively
assist them in committing moral wrongs. We do not actively
assist a friend in committing a moral wrong because we are loyal
to the friend. We know the friend would be diminished by the
commission of such acts. Now, to be sure, if the friend proceeds
to commit the wrong without our help, we remain loyal to the
friend. We do not end our friendship because a friend has done
something wrong. We steer our friend toward moral conduct, and
when we fail, we stick with our friend, focusing on her goodness,
and begin the process once again.115
112. FRIED, supra note 91, at 168.
113. Id. at 174.
114. Fried, supra note 5, at 1068-82.
115. Percival attributes a similar point to Aristotle, asserting that when our friends
do evil things, "[olur highest duty, then, is to continue the friendship in the hope of
reforming our friends." ARISTOTLE, supra note 69, at 103 (emphasis in original, indicating
translator's explanation). Aristotle was speaking here of the "friendship between good
men" rather than friendship based on utility, which Aristotle did not regard as friendship
in the true sense. Id. bk. VIII, at 23. To the extent that Fried's friendship analogy has
merit, the friendship between a lawyer and client would be based on utility.
For other critiques of Fried's friendship analogy, see Edward Dauer & Arthur Allen
Leff, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977); Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in
the Adversary System, in DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER (1983); William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 29.
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For the lawyer, this continuing loyalty of friendship often does
not exist. Remember, Fried defends the lawyer who assists a
client in committing a moral wrong through enforcement of a
legal right. After the wrong is done, the lawyer's work generally
is done as well. The continuing loyalty of the real friend is not
required of the lawyer, except within the narrow concerns of
confidentiality and conflict of interests. Indeed, consistent with
Fried's theory and ethics rules, the lawyer is free to take cases
against the former client, even to assist some new client in
committing a moral wrong against the former client, as long as
it is done in an unrelated matter for another legally entitled
client and involves no breach of confidences. What kind of friend-
ship is this?
The option of turning on the former client when the represen-
tation is ended is approved by ethics rules 16 and, apparently, by
Fried. Fried does not morally limit the lawyer's choice of clients.
According to Fried, a client may be accepted for whatever reason:
"idealism, greed, curiosity, love of luxury, love of travel, a need
for adventure or repose." 117
Thus, Fried proposes a strong theory of loyalty to the client
that absolutely protects the lawyer's autonomy in choosing cli-
ents; categorically enslaves the lawyer to protect the client's
autonomy; then finally permits the lawyer to attack that same
client in some new, unrelated matter. The friendship analogy and
the loyalty principle derived from it simply do not wash.
Fried's loyalty theory is ostensibly bolstered, but ultimately
undercut, by his friendship analogy. Nevertheless, his loyalty
theory is also justified on other grounds. Fried's theory of right
and wrong conduct as applied to the lawyer could still be a viable
basis for a loyalty theory. The aspect of Fried's loyalty theory
that requires the lawyer's assistance upon acceptance of the client
fails because his friendship analogy fails, but his theory of right
and wrong, which permits the lawyer's assistance, has different
underpinnings and is far more carefully elaborated.
Recall that Fried's theory of right and wrong in the professional
legal role proceeds from the justification of legal rights and the
corollary justification of a right to learn and assert one's legal
rights. The moral right to assert a legal right is not unqualified.
Fried acknowledges that it is morally wrong for a person to
116. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1989) (permitting a lawyer,
acting on behalf of a new client, to sue a former client in a new and unrelated matter).
117. Fried, supra note 5, at 1089.
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exercise her legal rights in some situations, for example, to avoid
a just punishment for a crime or to avoid the payment of a just
debt.118 In categorizing certain conduct as absolutely wrong and
thereby condemning it, Fried clearly limits the proper exercise
of personal autonomy. At the same time, Fried asserts that
persons should have the autonomy to choose whether to act
morally or immorally, at least in the context of asserting legal
rights, and that the lawyer who stands ready to facilitate that
choice, by agreeing to assist the client in acting immorally, is
doing good precisely because she is safeguarding the client's
autonomy.
There are paradoxes in this construct. Legal rights are good,
even though their assertion may be bad. Moreover, it is good
that one has the autonomy to assert one's legal rights, even
though the exercise of that autonomy may be bad. Finally, law-
yers do good in safeguarding the autonomy of clients to assert
legal rights, even though the exercise of that autonomy by the
client may be bad. At bottom, then, Fried asserts that lawyers
do good by safeguarding, within the limits of the law, the auton-
omy of clients to do bad."9
The celebration of autonomy suggested by this argument re-
flects a moral priority that is unjustifiable, particularly when it
permits one to willfully harm another for purely selfish reasons
by conduct that Fried asserts is itself morally wrongful. Never-
theless, we can allow that personal autonomy within the limits
of the law is a positive moral value. To make this allowance,
however, is a far cry from assigning it the highest moral value,
more valuable even than life itself.
If Fried grossly overstates the moral weight to which personal
autonomy is entitled, as I believe he does, the "iron requirement
of loyalty" he advances must be overstated as well. Nevertheless,
if the client's personal autonomy within the legal process is
entitled to some moral weight, then the lawyer's loyalty obliga-
tion to the client is also entitled to some moral weight. This is
due to the client's relative inability to assert her personal auton-
omy within the legal process without the aid of a lawyer.
The recognition that the lawyer's loyalty obligation has moral
weight is important. This recognition suggests, for example, that
David Luban creates a false dichotomy when he asserts that
118. FRIED, spra note 91, at 182.
119. Fried, of course, asserts that lawyers do good in many other ways as well.
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moral obligations take precedence over professional obligations.120
Luban fails to recognize that strictly professional obligations can
entail moral obligations, particularly the moral obligation of loyal
service to the client.
If loyalty to the client should sometimes prevail over competing
moral claims on the lawyer, the .lawyer's loyalty obligation itself
must carry moral weight. Fried's analysis, despite its shortcom-
ings, is valuable in identifying the client's dignity and autonomy
under the law as one source of the lawyer's moral obligation to
be loyal.121 The next section offers additional support to the claim
that the lawyer's loyalty obligation has moral weight.
C. Promises to be Loyal
The lawyer-client relation is generally voluntary on the part
of both parties.1' The lawyer's promise to provide loyal service,
the consent of the client to part with money, the disclosure of
private information in exchange for that promise, and the client's
reliance on the promise attend the formation of a lawyer-client
relation.
The promise of loyalty can be implied from the Anglo-American
tradition of the lawyer role, because loyalty is intrinsic to that
role as it is commonly understood by lawyers and clients alike.
The lawyer's promise of loyalty, derived from the tradition of
the lawyer role, is an example of "a usage of trade," as that
term is used in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) sections
1-201(3) and 1-205(2).123 Under these provisions of the U.C.C., the
terms of an agreement implicitly include "any practice or method
of dealing having such regularity of observance . . . as to justify
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question." 12 Absent an express agreement to the
120. LUBAN, supra note 22, at 155 ("[W]hen professional and moral obligations conflict,
the moral obligation takes precedence.").
121. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 57 ("[IThe attorney acts both professionally
and morally in assisting clients to maximize their autonomy, that is, by counseling clients
candidly and fully regarding the clients' legal rights and moral responsibilities as the
lawyer perceives them, and by assisting clients to carry out their lawful decisions.").
122. There are cases in which a lawyer is required to represent a client, but these
cases describe a small fraction of the work that lawyers do. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1989) ("A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment
by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause."). In addition, clients are
sometimes assigned counsel, especially indigent clients, but again, this representation
forms a relatively small part of the universe of lawyer-client relationships.
123. U.C.C. SS 1-201(3), 1-205(2) (1991).
124. Id. S 1-205(2).
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contrary, it is only fair that the lawyer's promise of loyal service
be an implied term of every representation agreement.
The lawyer's promise to be loyal, coupled with the client's
consent to part with valuable possessions in reliance on the
lawyer's loyalty, gives loyalty moral weight. As Patrick Atiyah
observed, "Morally, few would doubt that, prima facie at least,
a promise is per se binding.'" 125 Interestingly, Atiyah questions
whether contemporary support exists for that very proposition.126
Certainly, in the law, bare promises are not always binding. On
the other hand, when a promise is reasonably relied upon by the
person to whom the promise is made, the moral weight of the
promise is generally conceded, and usually the law compensates
the relying promisee, at least to the extent of the detriment
suffered because of the reliance.
Contemporary contract theory provides at least three different
approaches to when a moral and legal obligation to keep a promise
arises. H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls locate the obligation at the
earliest time possible, that is, upon the making of the promise.
Atiyah describes their position:
[Their] explanation posited the existence of a "practice,"
.whereby promises could be made, and if made, had to be
performed. To make a promise was to take part in this practice,
and to take part in a practice, like taking part in a game, was
to enjoy its benefits and hence to subject oneself to its rules.
To promise was to join a club; one got the benefit of member-
ship, and it was therefore reasonable, and moral, to accept the
burdens of membership as well.12
A second approach, advanced by Randy Barnett, is that the
moral duty to keep promises arises from the consent of the
promisor to part with something of value.128 Contracts transfer
125. P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193, 210
(1978).
126. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 652-59 (1979).
127. Id. at 654. Charles Fried adopts a similar view. CHARLES FIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE 14-17 (1981) ("An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he
has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral
grounds-for another to expect the promised performance."); see also Sissela Bok, Can
Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 917 (1990) ("A third fundamental moral
constraint is likewise universally stressed: that on betrayal, or going back on one's
word.").
128. Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 299 (1986)
("[Tihe consent of the rights holder to be legally obligated is the moral component that
distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights in a system of entitlements.").
[Vol. 33:367
LAWYERS AND LOYALTY
rights, in Barnett's view, and consent to the transfer of the right,
subject to the conditions of the consent, establishes the right in
the promisee.12 A right consensually transferred becomes the
right of the transferee, and it is usually morally wrong for the
transferor (promisor) to withhold the right after consenting to
its transfer.
Atiyah offers a third approach that emphasizes whether the
promisor has received a benefit for the promise or the promisee
has reasonably relied upon the promise to her detriment: "Surely,
nobody can doubt that, morally speaking, promises are more
strongly binding where payment has already been received, or
where there is a clear and significant act in reliance which would
worsen the position of the promisee if the promise were not
performed."'30 Moral obligations of a contractual sort arise, in
Atiyah's view, from the receipt of benefits or the inducement of
others to act to their detriment.
Thus, in his Essays on Contract, Atiyah asserts that "it is a
mistake to believe that there is (or is often) a moral obligation
(or a strong moral obligation) to observe a promise which has
not been paid for or relied upon."' 3' Atiyah's ambivalence can be
tolerated, however, because promises "do not usually remain
unrelied upon for very long.' '18 2
This reliance is certainly true in most legal representation, in
which clients usually rely on the lawyer's promise of loyalty at
the outset of the representation. This reliance is exhibited by
the client's disclosure of information and by the client foregoing
identical representation in the matter by another lawyer. A
client's reliance on a lawyer's promise to be loyal assuredly gives
moral weight to the duty of loyal conduct under each of the three
approaches recognized in contemporary contract theory.
The moral weight of the lawyer's loyalty obligation, attribut-
able to the lawyer's promise to be loyal and the client's right to
personal autonomy within the limits of the law, supports a pre-
sumption in favor of loyal conduct, even if that presumption
sometimes may be overcome by weightier moral concerns.1e The
129. Id. at 299-300.
130. Atiyah, supra note 125, at 219.
131. PATRICK ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 44 (1986).
132. I& at 31. Atiyah sometimes uses the term "reliance" in a very expansive sense,
including the mere expectation of performance as a form of reliance. See ATIYAH, supra
note 126, at 2-4.
133. Cases may exist, however, in which client reliance is lacking or even perverse. A
client may decide to abandon a claim for reasons unrelated to the lawyer's advice, while
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function of loyalty in this limited view is that loyalty to the client
requires a particular course of conduct unless good reason exists
to act otherwise. In this way, the lawyer's loyalty obligation
operates in much the same way that Rawls characterizes the
duty to obey the law: "a presumption in favor of compliance in
the absence of good reason to the contrary."'1 4
The lawyer's loyalty obligation carries moral weight, but its
justification is grounded in practical considerations as well. The
section that follows explores some of these considerations.
D. Loyalty and Effwiency
Several utilitarian justifications for loyalty have already been
suggested. Josiah Royce, for example, justified loyalty in terms
of the benefit it confers upon the loyalist in providing meaning
and direction to her life. 3 5 Andrew Oldenquist sees loyalty as a
countermeasure to alienation. 36 Charles Fried justifies loyalty by
a lawyer to a client in terms of supporting the rule of law in a
reasonably just system, which is a benefit to both society and
the client.137
Those who are disloyal without apparent good reason are
consigned to the annals of villainy, whose volumes contain such
notorious names as Judas, Delilah, and Benedict Arnold. Although
betrayal of one's God, lover, or country may be legendary wrongs,
walking out of the lawyer's office. Understanding how reliance can be found in this
situation is difficult.
An extreme example of perverse reliance is the disingenuous client who retains a
lawyer for a modest sum and provides the lawyer with confidential information about a
matter, not to enable the lawyer to represent the client, but to disqualify the lawyer
from representing the client's adversary. The story has made the rounds of the disgruntled
spouse in a small town who consulted with all of the lawyers in town about her
contemplated divorce before choosing a lawyer and then sought to disqualify all of the
lawyers she consulted from representing her spouse in the divorce. Although these cases
are far from the norm, perhaps special account should be taken of circumstances in which
the client's reliance is perverse.
134. John Rawls, The Justifieation of Civil Disobedience, in MORAL PROBLEMS: A CoL-
LECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 193 (James Rachels ed., 1971).
The analogy between the duty of loyalty and the duty to obey the law is especially
pertinent given the derivation of the word "loyalty." "Loyalty" is derived from the French
loi, which means law in the generic sense of that which ought to be obeyed. See Sophie
Bryant, Loyalty, in 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 183-88 (1916).
135. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. Ultimately, Royce's justification for
loyalty is less utilitarian than idealist and egoist. Nevertheless, Royce emphasized the
instrumental value of loyalty in ordering a person's life.
136. See supra note 70-73 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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betrayals in professional and business life are likewise villified,
at least when perpetrated without good cause. Although the case
for uncompromising loyalty may be weak, the case for an uncon-
ditional freedom to betray is weaker still.
Disloyalty without good reason can impose a heavy cost without
a compensating benefit. Marcia Baron illustrates this point by
suggesting what would result if engineers were free to disclose
the trade secrets of their employers and former employers. 138 In
a competitive market, a company with disloyal employees could
not compete successfully, and, if such disloyalty were common-
place in the market, the incentive for a company to invest in the
development of new products would be seriously compromisedlm9
In both cases, the social benefit, if any, of the disloyal behavior
does not begin to offset the cost imposed by that behavior.
In the context of legal practice, a prevailing "ethos" of disloy-
alty would certainly discourage many potential clients from em-
ploying lawyers. Consider the risk in hiring a lawyer who could
not be trusted to be loyal to one's interests. What confidential
information could be disclosed to such a lawyer? What matters
could be entrusted to her care? In some short-term lawyer-client
relationships involving no private information, the risk may not
be great, but this fact hardly describes the vast majority of the
work done by lawyers. Without loyalty to the client, the useful-
ness of lawyers would be seriously reduced. Moreover, an "ethos"
of lawyer disloyalty would cause havoc in a competitive economy.
These considerations highlight some practical benefits of the
lawyer's loyalty obligation to clients. Using tools of the social
sciences, Albert Hirschman identifies an additional practical ben-
efit of loyalty, one particularly germaine to law practice: the
tendency of loyalty to correct deficient performance, or, in the
case of clients, to inspire responsible behavior.1 40 The balance of
this section discusses Hirschman's ideas about the contribution
of loyalty to efficiency.
Hirschman describes the role of loyalty in a firm or organiza-
tion, in relation to the phenomena of "exit" and "voice," conclud-
ing that loyalty may contribute to the efficient management of
affairs. 141 "Exit," as developed in economic theory, refers to the
138. BARON, supra note 14, at 10-12.
139. Id at 11. Richard Posner has made the same argument. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978).
140. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 77-105 (1970).
141. Id-
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actions of customers who stop buying a firm's product and of
members of an organization who leave the organization. 142 When
the exit option is exercised, economists expect that revenues
drop or membership declines and "management is impelled to
search for ways and means to correct whatever faults have led
to exit."'143
"Voice," a term borrowed from political theory, is exercised
when a firm's customers or an organization's members express
dissatisfaction to management or others. 44 The rational response
by management to expressions of dissatisfaction is to "search for
the causes and possible cures of customers' and members' dis-
satisfaction.' 45 Thus, exit and voice are mechanisms that impel
management to become more efficient or, more broadly, to get
on the right track.146
The availability and attractiveness of the exit and voice options
vary greatly depending upon the person and the context. To use
a simple example, an individual consumer of mass-produced, in-
expensive, nondurable consumer goods ordinarily would express
dissatisfaction by exercising the exit option rather than the voice
option, if better brands of the same consumer product are avail-
able at the same cost. This result occurs because, in this context,
exercising exit is less costly than exercising voice, and voice is
less likely to achieve the desired result.
On the other hand, a firm that buys expensive durable products
from a particular manufacturer over many years may well ex-
ercise the voice option rather than the exit option when it first
notices a decrease in the quality of the product. The voice of this
customer is likely to be heard, and the cost of exit for the
customer may be quite high.
The decision to elect the exit option or the voice option, when
one is dissatisfied, depends upon many factors, including the
perceived likelihood that voice will produce the desired result,
the quality and cost of alternatives in the event of exit, and
loyalty. The nature of the organization from which the exit option
or to which the voice option may be exercised is also significant
and, often, controlling:
142. Id. at 4.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id-
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In a large number of organizations one of the two mechanisms
is in fact wholly dominant: on the one hand, there is competitive
business enterprise where performance maintenance relies
heavily on exit and very little on voice; on the other, exit is
ordinarily unthinkable, though not always wholly impossible,
from such primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church,
and state. The principal way for the individual member to
register his dissatisfaction with the way things are going in
these organizations is normally to make his voice heard in
some fashion.'47
In circumstances in which both the exit option and the voice
option are available, loyalty influences the election. Hirschman
finds a strong relation between loyalty and voice. The more one
believes that her voice will be heard, the more one is likely to
be loyal, loyalty deriving in part from the perceived effectiveness
of one's voice. Similarly, the more loyal one is, the more one is
likely to use voice rather than exit because the cost of exit is
higher in personal terms.'4 Moreover, Hirschman argues that
loyalty is beneficial, because it prompts the use of voice to correct
an organization's deficiencies. Hirschman concludes that "loyalty,
far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful purpose
of preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so
often does when there is no barrier to exit.' 149
Loyalty is a self-imposed barrier to exit, and, like most barriers
to exit, it serves to stimulate voice. Voice needs such stimulation.
As Hirschman observes, exit is neat compared to the "messiness
and heartbreak" of voice.1  The neatness of exit is largely at-
tributable to its certainty, unlike the risk of failure involved in
voice. In addition, exit involves a "clearcut either-or decision,"' 5'
while voice is "essentially an art constantly evolving in new
directions.' 5 2
If exit and voice both communicate dissatisfaction to manage-
ment, why be concerned that exit is often more attractive than
voice? Hirschman finds that the most quality-conscious persons
are first to exit in many circumstances.' 6 Moreover, these per-
sons are most likely to effect a positive change by use of voice.
147. I& at 76.
148. I& at 77-78.
149. Id at 79.
150. I& at 107.
151. Id
152. Id- at 43.
153. Id. at 50-52.
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In an employment context, for example, if employee dissatisfac-
tion is widespread, the most marketable employees have the
greatest incentive to exit the firm, because exit for them can be
accomplished at little cost. Moreover, because of their value as
employees, exit by the most marketable members of the firm
will cause further deterioration of the firm, perhaps so much
deterioration that the firm will be unable to correct its deficien-
cies. In addition, these same employees often may be most effec-
tive in correcting by use of voice the deficiencies leading to the
general dissatisfaction. Thus, in contexts such as this, voice is
superior to exit in terms of correcting deficiencies and avoiding
further deterioration.
When exit is a readily available option, Hirschman sees loyalty
as the key to an election of voice over exit. Loyalty locks the
loyalist into the organization a little longer, thereby creating
greater incentive to exercise voice. At the same time, the exercise
of voice is made more effective by the loyalist's threat of exit,
whether that threat is explicit or implicit.154 This result occurs
because, if the loyalist is of value to the organization, the risk
of the loyalist's exit will itself be an incentive to correct the
deficiencies of the organizationlee
To sum up the discussion thus far, Hirsciman finds that or-
ganizational deficiencies can be corrected by either exit or voice,
that voice is more effective than exit in correcting deficiencies
in some contexts, and that loyalty delays exit and encourages
voice. Loyalty has less value when exit is difficult or impossible,
because the incentive for voice is already present in those cir-
cumstances. According to Hirschman, however, dangers arise in
imposing too high a price for exit.ee
When exit is difficult or impossible, the threat of exit is
ineffective. In some contexts, such as the family, this situation
encourages resort to voice. In other contexts, the absence of the
voluntary exit option discourages voice because exercise of voice
may provoke a forced exit that entails difficult burdens, for
example, loss of livelihood. Thus, if the objective is to encourage
154. I& at 82-86.
155. Id. But see Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 722-26
(1987), in which Ellmann expresses concern about the coercive nature of threats to
withdraw and their effect on the client's freedom of self-determination. Ellmann supports
strongly clients' competence and entitlement to make decisions, consistent with the theory
of client-centered practice. See also DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
156. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 140, at 96-98.
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voice, a high price for exit may prove to be counterproductive
in some organizational contexts. Moreover, exit has its virtues.
Not only is exit an important mechanism for correcting organi-
zational deficiencies, but the realistic threat of exit gives greatest
effect to voice.
Hirschman's theory has important implications for the lawyer's
duty of loyalty to a client. Assuming that the lawyer's objective
is to steer the client toward lawful and morally responsible
behavior, Hirschman's work suggests that exit and voice are
effective mechanisms for doing so. If a client proposes improper
conduct and the lawyer exits (withdraws) too quickly, the oppor-
tunity to put the client on the right track may be compromised,
if not lost. By exercising voice, the lawyer is in the best position
to influence the client toward proper conduct. On the other hand,
if exit by the lawyer is made too difficult, the effectiveness of
the lawyer's voice will be compromised because voice is most
effective when accompanied by the realistic threat of exit, whether
that threat is express or implied. Hirschman's work thus suggests
that the duty of loyalty to the client should be strong enough to
lock the lawyer into serving the client a little longer, so that
voice more likely will be exercised. The duty of loyalty, however,
should not be so strong as to deprive the lawyer of the realistic
possibility of exit, for if the duty is so strong as to foreclose
exit, the lawyer's voice will be less effective15 7
Hirschman's functional analysis of loyalty suggests that loyalty
plays a constructive role in professional relationships, but that a
157. How often lawyers withdraw from the representation of paying clients who seek
lawful, but morally wrongful, objectives is unknown. Perhaps the issue rarely arises
because of an ethical compatibility between clients and the lawyers they choose, a
compatibility made likely by cognitive dissonance, a phenomenon discussed by Hirschman.
Id. at 91-96; see also Lon L. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lauyer, in THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER 287-88 (Kenneth L Winston ed., 1981), in which Fuller comments on
cognitive dissonance for the lawyer.
In those instances where he had some doubts about the client's case at the
beginning, these doubts evaporate after he has worked on the case for a
few days; his client's cause then comes to seem at once logical and just. He
worries a little that he might have experienced the same conversion had he
been working on the other side, but this slight concern does not detract
from his zeal or his desire to advance his client's interests.
Id-
Perhaps, the dilemma is common but, as with the investments by many multinational
corporations in South Africa, the moral scruples of lawyers have taken second seat to
the profit motive. This concern seems particularly legitimate when even the American
Bar Association condemns widespread commercialism in the legal profession. See Report
of the Commission on Professionalism, supra note 84, at 251. The Report asks whether
the legal profession has "abandoned principle for profit." Id.
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theory of loyalty that absolutely forbids disloyalty is inefficient
in many organizational settings. Moreover, the relationship be-
tween client and lawyer is one such setting in which a limited
loyalty obligation may be efficient. In combination with other
utilitarian justifications for the lawyer's loyalty obligation,
Hirschman's theory gives further support to the need for the
lawyer's loyalty obligation, subject to limitations.
IV. LIMITS ON THE LOYALTY OBLIGATION
Beginning principles of a theory of loyalty for lawyers have
already been suggested: the lawyer's loyalty obligation to clients
is practical and has moral weight that a lawyer must consider in
deciding on a course of action. In some circumstances, the loyalty
obligation may be less weighty than other moral concerns. Pro-
fessional ideals of lawyer conduct, which presume to resolve
loyalty dilemmas, are generally useful but may not provide cor-
rect moral solutions in unanticipated circumstances.
In the following sections, I advance some additional principles
forming a theory of loyalty for lawyers. Among these principles
are that the lawyer's loyalty obligation is defined by its scope
as well as its strength, that the loyalty obligation dictates caution
in agreeing to represent clients, that the lawyer's reasons for
disloyal behavior are crucial, and that the legitimacy of disloyal
behavior is influenced by the methods, goals, and costs it entails.
A. The Scope of the Lawyer's Loyalty Obligation
Disloyalty has meaning only in relation to valid claims of
loyalty; no disloyalty can exist when loyalty is not owing. Marcia
Baron distinguishes valid claims of loyalty from bogus claims,'1
and this distinction is essential to identifying the scope of a
lawyer's loyalty obligation. For example, a client might assert
that her lawyer was disloyal by purchasing a competitor's product
rather than her product, but the lawyer as a lawyer has no duty
of loyalty of this sort. Baron labels such loyalty claims "bogus"
because they conflate loyalty in the performance of a role with
a more thorough-going loyalty as a person.5 9 If the duty of loyalty
to a client arises only by virtue of the lawyer-client relationship,
the scope of that loyalty is limited by the relationship. The
158. BARON, supra note 14, at 15-16.
159. Id.
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lawyer, thus, may prefer to buy someone else's products, play
golf with others, even vote for the client's opponent in an election
for a public office, without being disloyal. The lawyer's loyalty
obligation is limited by the scope of the services that the lawyer
promises to provide.
Fried also distinguishes valid loyalty claims from invalid ones
and concludes that "the lawyer must scrupulously contain his
assistance and advocacy within the dictates of the law. 16° A
lawyer should not promise as a lawyer to do what is unlawful,
nor should she imply such a promise. The lawyer's implied prom-
ise of loyalty, derived from the American tradition of the lawyer
role, cannot be understood to entail a promise to act illegally.
Nor does the "client's autonomy within the law"161 justify illegal
conduct by the lawyer. Thus, the lawyer's loyalty obligation to
a client is also limited by the law.
1. Legal Limits on Loyalty
That loyalty is limited by legality may be logical, but it is also
troubling. The limits of legality are often uncertain, and so the
promise of loyalty must be uncertain as well. This uncertainty
raises the problem of whether the lawyer's loyalty obligation
should extend to all that is arguably legal. It is my position that
the lawyer may agree to be loyal only within the fairly certain
bounds of legality. When a lawyer's proposed or actual conduct
enters the fog of uncertain legality, she has passed the limits of
loyalty.
If loyalty is limited by legality, there is no useful sense in
which loyalty is promised when legality is uncertain. Suppose,
for example, that a client demands the return of a document in
the lawyer's possession. The document constitutes evidence that
the client has committed a crime that authorities are just begin-
ning to investigate. If the client clearly will destroy the document
if the document is returned to her, the lawyer may be guilty of
obstruction of justice in returning the document to the client
knowing that the client will destroy it. Unfortunately, the scope
of obstruction of justice statutes is unclear in many jurisdictions,
160. Fried, supra note 5, at 1081. Fried recognizes that lawyers may choose at times
to defy immoral laws to further a client's rights, but in such cases the lawyer goes
beyond her duty as lawyer (or as Fried terms it, "travels outside the bounds of legal
friendship") Id.
161. Id. at 1073.
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and the lawyer may be uncertain as to whether the return of
the document to the client would be a crime under the circum-
stances. If the loyalty obligation applies even though the legality
of the proposed lawyer conduct is uncertain, the lawyer would
be required to commit what might later be judged a criminal act.
To press the lawyer into possibly illegal conduct by means of
the loyalty obligation undermines the lawyer's role of maximizing
client autonomy within the legal system. The lawyer's role be-
comes contradictory and incoherent if the lawyer is obligated to
engage in possibly illegal conduct, as in this illustration by
delivering the document to the client. Moreover, the loyalty
dilemma may be exacerbated rather than relieved by extending
the loyalty obligation into the realm of the possibly illegal. The
lawyer's self-interest in behaving lawfully suddenly conflicts with
the lawyer's obligation to behave loyally. Wise judgments about
the limits of lawful conduct may be even more difficult for the
lawyer faced with this conflict.
On the other hand, the limits on loyalty required by legality
can be a trap for the client, whose ignorance may encourage a
reliance wider than the loyalty that a lawyer can reasonably
promise. A foreseeable gap between the lawyer's promised loy-
alty and the client's expected reliance should prompt the lawyer
to advise the client of the legal limits on the lawyer's loyalty
obligation. This advice follows from the consensual nature of the
lawyer's loyalty obligation. A lawyer can generally satisfy the
duty to advise by instructing the client that the lawyer must
operate within the strict limits of the law in representing a client.
In many circumstances, even this sort of warning may be unnec-
essary because of the unlikelihood that a misunderstanding will
occur. The client's foreseeable reliance on the lawyer's agreement
to be loyal imposes on the lawyer a duty to clarify the scope of
that agreement when misunderstandings are likely to occur.
2. Contractual Limits on Loyalty
Loyalty also may be limited by the lawyer's express agreement
with the client, subject to some limitations.162 This follows from
the promise-consent-reliance basis for the duty of loyalty. The
duty of loyalty has moral weight, in part, because the lawyer
162. This limitation is also recognized by ethics rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1989) ("A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation
if the client consents after consultation.").
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and client agree that the lawyer will be loyal and the client relies
on that agreement. The scope of the agreement upon which the
client reasonably relies substantially defines the scope of the
moral duty. As the agreement is made more express and narrow,
the moral duty is thereby limited.
For example, a lawyer's loyalty may be limited by an agree-
ment to handle some client matters but not others. Thus, a
lawyer may agree to represent the client in relation to her tax
problems but not in unrelated litigation in which the client is
involved, and no duty of loyalty should arise with respect to that
litigation. In addition, a lawyer and client may agree in advance
that the lawyer will pursue some client objectives but not others,
such as seeking damages for a nuisance but not an abatement.
The right to limit a lawyer's loyalty by prior agreement is
subject to limitations, however. The terms of the lawyer-client
agreement can never be fully expressed and consented to at the
outset of the representation, given the complex traditions and
laws that define the lawyer-client relation. Some elements of the
relation will always be drawn from the traditions and laws
defining the lawyer's role. If vital aspects of those traditions and
laws are expressly excluded from the agreement, the relation is
no longer one of lawyer and client; the essential features of the
lawyer-client relation are lacking, and so the relation must be of
some other sort. This factor may explain in part the prohibition
against an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability
to a client for malpractice; such an agreement is inconsistent
with the lawyer's agreement to perform as a lawyer.16 Thus, the
agreement to serve the client as a lawyer must include essential
features of the lawyer-client relation, as various traditions and
laws define that relation. Certainly, the loyalty obligation is, in
some dimension, one such essential feature.
A second qualification to the right to limit the lawyer's duty
of loyalty by prior agreement is closely related to the first: the
client must give informed consent to the agreement. Client con-
sent to limitations on the lawyer's agreement to be loyal defeats
a client's claim of reasonable reliance on a more expansive agree-
ment. Uninformed consent, however, hardly improves the law-
yer's moral position.164
163. See id. Rule 1.8(h). The Model Rules also provide that "the client may not be
asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate" the lawyer's duty to
provide competent representation. Id. Rule 1.2 cmt.
164. Ethics rules recognize the same consideration. A lawyer may limit the objectives
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The lawyer and client possess the power to define the lawyer-
client relation by their agreement, but this power is limited in
important respects. The power of the parties to define their
relation is limited by the traditions and laws that define the
relation. Moreover, because the relation may evolve over the
course of time, especially if significant factgathering and deci-
sionmaking are required, the relation may require periodic re-
definition. As Ian Macneil observes: "In complex relations,
obligations, often heavily binding ones, arise simply out of day
to day operations, habits, customs, etc., which occur with precious
little thought by anyone about the obligations they might entail,
or about their possible consequences.1 65
Macneil suggests that events, perhaps as much as agreements,
traditions, and laws, reshape the obligations that arise under
contracts involving complex relations. This point about relational
contracts threatens the promise-consent-reliance foundation for
the lawyer's moral obligation of loyalty. This threat can be
addressed without denying it in several ways.
First, contracts may be considered as falling on a continuum,
with transactional contracts at one end and relational contracts
at the other end. Transactional contracts are typically "one-shot
deals between relative strangers"16 occurring in a market in
which other parties make nearly identical exchanges (such as
buying bolts at the hardware store). Relational contracts are
more complex and usually occur over an extended period of time
(for example, employment contracts and the internal contracts
governing institutional arrangements). Some legal representation
is more transactional, such as a single small collection matter for
a one-time business client. Some legal representation is more
relational, such as service as in-house counsel for a corporation.
Most legal representation falls somewhere in the middle of the
continuum, although probably toward the relational end.
Second, the express terms of an agreement are most relevant
in equitably identifying the obligations of parties to transactional
contracts. In discrete, one-shot transactions, Macneil concedes
that the express and consented-to terms of the contract work
of the representation only if the client consents after consultation. Id Rule 1.2(c).
"Consultation" is defined as "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit
the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." Id. Terminology.
165. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract- What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 483, 503.
166. PETER LINZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 68 (1989).
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fairly well in defining the obligations of the parties.1 7 In contracts
of this sort, a client's reliance on a loyalty disclaimed in the
agreement seems especially unreasonable.
Third, the express terms of an agreement remain relevant in
relational contracts, although the complex and changing circum-
stances of relational contracts often diminish the importance of
the express terms in equitably identifying the obligations of the
parties. Fixed and reliable planning generally requires some
degree of express understanding between contracting parties and
these express understandings continue to contribute to an equi-
table identification of the parties' obligations. At the same time,
the need for flexibility in relational contracts reduces the impor-
tance of express understandings.
Finally, even in relational contracts, the parties have the power
periodically (even continually) to redefine their agreement to meet
changed circumstances. This is especially true in legal represen-
tation, when collaborative decisions are often required throughout
the course of the representation.
Thus, the lawyer and client may shape the lawyer's loyalty
obligation by agreement, but not necessarily in any way they
choose and not necessarily for all time. Agreed-upon limitations
on the lawyer's duty of loyalty generally should be valid, but not
if the limitations are inconsistent with the lawyer role or if
circumstances change too greatly, and only if the client gives an
informed consent to the limitation.
S. Summary
The limits of the lawyer's loyalty obligation to a client inhere
in the lawyer role and may be defined, to some extent, by the
express agreement of the parties. Some limits are established by
law; the loyalty obligation as a lawyer cannot compel the lawyer
to act illegally. Other limits arise by virtue of the tradition of
the lawyer role. Lawyers should clarify the extent of their loyalty
obligation if a client misunderstands the limits involved.
B. Client Selection
When a lawyer agrees to represent a client, some duty of
loyalty to the client arises. Two central problems are presented:
To what extent are lawyers free to reject cases, thereby avoiding
167. d.
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loyalty obligations? To what extent are lawyers free to accept
cases, thereby incurring loyalty obligations?
These questions are discussed in a vast body of thoughtful
literature, 168 although not necessarily with a focus on loyalty
concerns. Those discussions need not be repeated here. Never-
theless, as my phrasing of the questions suggests, loyalty con-
cerns are relevant to questions of client selection. In particular,
lawyers should be cautious about incurring loyalty obligations,
especially when loyalty dilemmas are likely to arise.
A morally responsible lawyer should be concerned about the
valid client loyalty claims to which she will be subject. Valid
loyalty claims can give rise to loyalty dilemmas, in which the
lawyer is compelled to do what, in the absence of the loyalty
claim, she would consider wrongful. We should be loath to put
ourselves in a position in which our conduct unavoidably will
entail a moral wrong, either in the form of disloyalty or, if we
remain loyal, in committing some other form of moral wrong.
The risk of confronting a loyalty dilemma is especially great
in relational representation agreements, which may impose un-
foreseeable demands upon the lawyer, demands that the lawyer
would avoid if given the prior opportunity. The risk is also great
when the lawyer agrees to represent a client notwithstanding
the foreseeability of a particular loyalty dilemma.
In every representation, a lawyer has some risk of a loyalty
dilemma arising, although the risk usually is quite small. As the
risk increases, either because the representation is more rela-
tional than transactional or because a dilemma is specifically
foreseeable, caution in agreeing to the representation should
increase as well.
Risk, foreseeability, and caution-the language of negligence-
hardly provide a substantive prescription for conduct. Loyalty
concerns do little to refine client selection issues, except to
underscore the significance of those issues and discredit the
position that lawyers are ethically free to represent whomever
they wish for whatever reasons.169
168. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 49-50; FRIED, supra note 91, at 179-83;
LUBAN, supra note 22, at 282-88; WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 571-78.
169. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 5, at 1076-80. "The lawyer's liberty-moral liberty-to
take up what kind of practice he chooses and to take up or decline what clients he will
is an aspect of the moral liberty of self to enter into personal relations freely" Id. at
1078.
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C. Reasons for Disloyalty
Disloyalty may be intentional or inadvertent, and it may be
prompted by good reasons or bad. My concern is principally with
intentional disloyalty, even though the effect of disloyalty may
be the same whether it is intentional or inadvertent. By inten-
tional disloyalty, I mean the lawyer's implementation of a decision
to privilege some concern over the lawyer's loyalty obligation to
the client.
According to this definition, disloyalty requires that the lawyer
implement the decision to be disloyal. Disloyalty in the lawyer's
heart will not do. Just as loyalty takes form only in loyal conduct,
so too disloyalty takes form only in disloyal conduct. The temp-
tation or plan to be disloyal, so long as it remains inchoate, may
be transient. It lacks the finality (and the potential consequences)
of an implemented decision.
Decisions may be implemented either by action or by the failure
to act. A lawyer, for example, may implement a decision to be
disloyal by failing to object to the introduction of certain evidence
or by failing to insert a provision in a contract or other document.
Although actions and omissions may have different moral weight
in other contexts, loyalty establishes a duty to act in a certain
way. For this reason, when a failure to act defeats a valid claim
of loyalty, the inaction is equally as disloyal as an action that
defeats a valid claim.
Limiting disloyalty to instances of decisions to be disloyal
excludes inadvertent conduct. The lawyer who unthinkingly blurts
out a confidence or who does not see that certain damaging
evidence is inadmissible and so fails to object to its introduction
may be guilty of disloyalty, but not in the sense discussed in this
Article. Inadvertent disloyalty may certainly be condemned and
punished, but it implicates far different moral concerns than
intentional disloyalty.
Intentional disloyalty suggests a weighing of the loyalty obli-
gation against some competing concern and choosing to privilege
the competing concern. This process involves moral decisionmak-
ing because the lawyer's loyalty obligation has moral weight. The
reasons for disloyalty are too numerous to catalogue. Some gross
categorizations may be useful, however.
1. Self-Interested Disloyalty
Lawyers sometimes are disloyal to a client in order to secure
a financial or other material benefit or to avoid a harm to
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themselves. Lawyers who advance their own interests at their
clients' expense ordinarily could not justify adequately their
disloyal conduct. In some circumstances, however, even self-
interested disloyalty may be justified.
The extent to which loyalty is owing may depend on the client's
fulfillment of reciprocal promises. For example, if a lawyer agrees
to provide loyal service in exchange for a fee, and the client fails
to pay the fee as agreed, the lawyer may be disloyal to the
extent of breaching her duty to continue to provide legal services.
The disloyal conduct in this example may be prompted solely by
the lawyer's financial self-interest and, yet, may be justified.170
Self-interested disloyalty may even be justified in some cases
in which the client keeps her part of the bargain. Suppose, for
example, that a lawyer agrees to handle certain matters pro bono
for a destitute client. The lawyer later discovers, and could not
have anticipated, that the legal matters are extraordinarily com-
plex and require enormous expenditures of time and money to
bring to a conclusion. Again, the lawyer, solely for reasons of
financial self-interest, may be justified in acting disloyally to the
extent of withdrawing from the representation.1 7 1
These examples involve self-interested disloyalty by withdraw-
ing from the representation of a client. More egregious forms of
self-interested disloyalty sometimes may be justified as well. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit lawyers, for reasons
of self-interest, to disclose confidential client information in lim-
ited circumstances, for example to enable the lawyer to defend
herself against criminal charges or civil claims based upon con-
duct in which the client was involved. 72
These examples of lawful self-interested disloyalty do not sug-
gest a coherent theory of when lawyer self-interest justifies
disloyalty to a client. Charles Wolfram intimates that the excep-
tion to the confidentiality rule founded on lawyer self-interest
may reflect little more than that lawyers drafted the Rules. 73
Contrary to the implication of the Model Rules, the lawyer's
self-interest will never justify disloyalty to a client, given the
moral weight of the loyalty obligation, unless, in the circum-
stances, the lawyer's self-interest has considerable moral weight
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(4) (1989). For a discussion
of when client abandonment is disloyal, see infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
171. See id. Rule 1.16(b)(5).
172. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(2).
173. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 308 ("An exception addressed only' to the special needs
and fairness claims of lawyers naturally arouses strong suspicions of special pleading.").
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of its own. Perhaps, when a client has violated her promises to
the lawyer, the lawyer's dignitary interests assume adequate
moral weight to justify withdrawal from the representation. In
addition, when a legal matter assumes totally unanticipated pro-
portions, the lawyer may have a weighty moral claim for avoiding
the indentured servitude that continued representation would
entail. Finally, if the client's wrongdoing will impose criminal or
civil liability upon the lawyer, the lawyer may have a moral right
to defend herself by disclosing confidential information about the
client.
My purpose is not to defend these ethics rules that permit
self-interested disloyalty by lawyers. Indeed, the rules may go
too far in some directions and not far enough in others. However,
the moral weight of the lawyer's loyalty obligation to clients can
be overcome only by weightier moral concerns. When disloyal
conduct in the lawyer's self-interest has weak moral justification,
the conduct is morally wrongful, irrespective of what the lawyer
stands to lose.
Thus, utilitarian calculations are irrelevant when self-interested
disloyalty lacks moral justification. Even if the lawyer stands to
profit greatly from disloyal acts that minimally harm the client,
the disloyalty is still wrongful if it has no independent moral
justification. Perhaps the lawyer could buy her freedom from the
loyalty obligation by giving the client something of value to
secure her release, but barring that circumstance, the disloyalty
is unjustified.
Arguably, compelling cases of disloyalty arise when the lawyer
can attract a substantially more remunerative client by abandon-
ing an existing client in order to avoid a conflict of interest. The
benefit to the lawyer may be great by changing clients, and the
first client may be able easily to secure equally effective repre-
sentation from another lawyer. As financially compelling as this
case may be, a good reason for disloyalty is not present. The
essence of loyalty is service and self-sacrifice. Loyalty is stripped
of all substance if self-interested disloyalty is justified by eco-
nomic considerations alone.
2. Legally Compelled Disloyalty
Lawyers are legally required to be disloyal to their clients in
some instances. In a sense, this behavior does not constitute
disloyalty at all, because a client's claim of loyalty that requires
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a lawyer to act illegally is invalid.174 Nevertheless, because a
claim of loyalty may be valid up to the point that adherence to
the claim requires illegal conduct, the lawyer's legally required
conduct has the appearance of disloyalty.
The most striking examples of legally compelled "disloyalty"
involve legal duties to disclose confidential client information, for
example when disclosure is necessary to avoid a fraud on a court
or when confidential information is outside the scope of the
lawyer-client evidentiary privilege and the lawyer is compelled
to testify. Other examples include prohibitions against filing
frivolous claims and defenses, ex parte communications with
judges, and direct communications with persons who are repre-
sented by counsel. All of these forms of conduct could be pre-
sumptively required by valid claims of loyalty on the lawyer as
a lawyer, except for their illegality. The presumption of loyal
conduct does not arise in these cases because no valid claim of
loyalty compels the lawyer to act illegally.
3. Scmpulous Disloyalty
The law sometimes permits, and even condones, wrongful con-
duct, and lawyers are sometimes prompted to be disloyal out of
concern for the public good or the welfare of third parties. These
cases often present the most difficult moral dilemmas arising
from the lawyer's loyalty obligation.
It is relevant here to reassert the principle that lawyers should
avoid loyalty obligations (that is, reject cases) in which the
likelihood of disloyal behavior is great. The problem with this
prescription is that it begs the question of when disloyal conduct
will be appropriate or required for reasons of the public good or
the welfare of third parties. If lawyers are free to be disloyal
whenever their personal scruples dictate, the agreement to serve
loyally seems illusory because it may be breached unilaterally
for reasons that seem unpredictable. Moreover, if lawyers are
free to be disloyal whenever their personal scruples dictate,
lawyers would seem to be free to have no scruples. Both impli-
cations are unacceptable: lawyers are demigods of morality and
are absolved from the obligations of moral conduct.
Nevertheless, lawyers find themselves in circumstances in which
competing moral claims require a choice, and the moral weight
of the client's loyalty claim may be less than that of the competing
174. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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moral claim. When this situation occurs, scrupulous disloyalty is
justifiable, and may even be required. Monroe Freedman argues,
for example, that preserving the life of a third party involves
greater moral weight than loyalty to a client, irrespective of the
extent of the valid loyalty claim that the client may assert.175
Charles Fried finds that humiliating a witness is not justified by
the duty of loyalty to a client. 76 Marvin Frankel subordinates
the duty of loyalty to the value of determining the truth and,
thus, would require lawyers to report to the court and opposing
counsel the existence of both relevant evidence and witnesses
upon which the lawyer does not intend to rely.'7 Murray Schwartz
concludes that the lawyer's loyalty obligation does not justify
efforts "to obtain an unconscionable advantage over another
person."78
When a competing moral claim outweighs the client's loyalty
claim, the lawyer is morally obligated to prefer the competing
claim. Lawyers are not demigods of morality, nor are they ab-
solved from the obligations of moral conduct. Lawyers are bound
by moral obligation just as all actors are, but among the moral
obligations to which lawyers are bound is the obligation to honor
valid loyalty claims of the client, in the absence of superior moral
claims.
Positive law will never be able to specify all of the circum-
stances in which a competing moral claim will be superior to the
client's valid loyalty claim. Loyalty dilemmas are not susceptible
to reliable categorical solutions because the weight of valid loy-
alty claims and competing claims vary radically according to the
circumstances of the case. Even though specific guidance through
rules may be impossible, it is clear that scrupulous disloyalty is
sometimes justified, and it is possible to identify several impor-
tant variables bearing on its justification. The next section dis-
cusses some of those variables.
D. Implementing the Decision to be Disloyal: The Methods,
Goals, and Costs of Disloyalty
An approach that makes lawyers demigods of morality not
subject to moral obligations (beyond those that also constitute
175. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 102-04.
176. FmnD, supra note 91, at 190-93.
177. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031, 1057 (1975).
178. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL.
L. REV. 669, 685-86 (1978).
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legal obligations) seems the ultimate in arrogance. Yet, this very
formulation finds some support in Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.16, which permits a lawyer to abandon a client, even
if withdrawal has a material adverse effect on the interests of
the client, whenever the client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent. 179 Lawyers
are nowhere in the Rules required to feel repugnance toward
any particular client objectives, nor are they limited by the Rules
with respect to what objectives they may consider repugnant.
Scrupulous disloyalty may be implemented under the Rules or-
dinarily only by client abandonment, although, in limited and
important circumstances, disclosure of client confidences is also
permitted. 180
The subject of scrupulous disloyalty has supported a vast trade
in ideas among legal writers, who have attempted to impose
moral obligations on lawyers without thereby making them dem-
igods of morality who freely may disregard the loyalty princi-
ple.' 8' Many lines have been drawn to demarcate when scrupulous
disloyalty is permitted or required. This section discusses the
three principal methods by which a decision to be scrupulously
disloyal may be implemented: by abandoning the client, by dis-
closing client confidences, or by lying to the client. 82 The various
goals and costs of disloyal conduct are addressed as well.
1. Client Abandonment
Client abandonment does not always involve disloyalty. If client
abandonment were invariably disloyal, the corporate counsel who
changed jobs after fifteen years in the client's legal department
would engage in disloyal conduct. The promise of loyalty as a
lawyer does not include life-long representation, although some
loyalty obligations, such as confidentiality, are life-long in their
duration. The servitude of life-long representation is often inef-
ficient, as Hirschman concludes in noting that voice can be
179. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1989).
180. See id. Rules 1.6(b), 3.3(a)(2).
181. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1988);
Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311
(1990); Subin, supra note 8.
182. It is possible, of course, to implement the decision to be disloyal by switching
sides and actively working to defeat the client's objectives. This form of implementation
also requires abandonment, disclosure, or lying, or perhaps a combination of them.
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effectively quieted when exit becomes too costly.183 More impor-
tantly, lawyers do not generally promise to provide life-long
service, nor do the traditions of the lawyer's role entail life-long
service.
It does not follow, however, that client abandonment is never
disloyal. The agreement to provide loyal service as a lawyer
necessarily includes an agreement to provide some services.
When the lawyer is retained for a particular matter, the lawyer
and client often contemplate that the lawyer will see that matter
through to its conclusion. Even when less than this result is
reasonably contemplated, the lawyer agrees to be of some help.
Client abandonment is disloyal when the lawyer withdraws prior
to completion of the agreed service.
If, in every representation, the duty of loyalty by continued
service extends at least to expressly promised services, the
extent of the duty generally is determined by the understanding
between lawyer and client. The understanding may be express,
as when the lawyer agrees to draft a will, negotiate the sale of
property, or handle an appeal. In other cases, the understanding
may be more nebulous, as when an attorney agrees "to look into"
a matter in contemplation of possible litigation or agrees to
generally advise a client about the client's proposed conduct. The
common thread running through all cases is that the lawyer
agrees to do something, and it is the extent of that agreement
that defines the lawyer's duty of loyalty by continued service.
The duty of loyalty by continued service is not defined solely
at the outset of the representation, although it is invariably
defined to some extent at that time. As the representation
proceeds, the understanding between lawyer and client as to
what the lawyer will do may change. In this sense, the duty of
loyalty by continued service is constantly evolving.
The foregoing discussion is preliminary to an assessment of
scrupulous disloyalty by client abandonment, because it is impor-
tant to determine when client abandonment is disloyal. The
presumption in favor of loyal conduct creates a presumption
against client abandonment in circumstances in which a valid
loyalty claim to the lawyer's continued service exists. This pre-
sumption operates irrespective of the extent to which client
abandonment imposes a cost on the client.
Disloyalty by client abandonment always imposes some cost
on the client, if only in terms of the client's hurt feelings,
183. HuISCHMAN, supra note 140, at 97.
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annoyance, or inconvenience. The cost of disloyalty by client
abandonment, however, varies significantly depending on the
circumstances. Disloyal client abandonment early in the repre-
sentation may impose few costs other than the inconvenience of
securing new counsel. Abandonment at critical points in the
representation, however, can cost the client the objective for
which representation was sought.
The lawyer's goals in being scrupulously disloyal by client
abandonment may differ as well. The scrupulously disloyal law-
yer's goal may be simply to avoid personal participation in the
client's unacceptable plan, or she may want to defeat the plan.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide little dis-
couragement to disloyalty by client abandonment. Taken at face
value, Rule 1.16 permits lawyers to abandon their clients at any
time and for any reason "if withdrawal can be accomplished
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client."'184
Lawyers may abandon their clients, consistent with the Rule,
even if the client will suffer a material adverse effect, whenever
"a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers . . imprudent."1 S5 Unlike other provisions of the Model
Rules,18 6 Rule 1.16 contains no objective standard for limiting
what a lawyer may subjectively regard as an "imprudent" client
objective warranting withdrawal even at a significant cost to the
client. The only protection afforded the client who is disloyally
abandoned is that, upon withdrawal, "a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's inter-
ests."187
In addition to giving the lawyer broad discretion to abandon
her client disloyally, the Model Rules require withdrawal if "the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional
conduct or other law."'1 As previously suggested,8 9 a lawyer has
no loyalty obligation to commit illegal acts, and the provisions
for required withdrawal implement this principle.
In sum, the Model Rules express concern about minimizing
client harm when lawyers abandon their clients, but broader
184. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1989); see also id. Rule 1.3 cmt.
("Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry
through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client").
185. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3).
186. See, e.g., id. Rules 1.6(b), 1.7.
187. Id. Rule 1.16(d).
188. Id. Rule 1.16(a)(1).
189. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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loyalty concerns are strikingly absent. Even a fickle lawyer
enjoys substantial protection under Rule 1.16. The Model Rules
fall far short of enforcing the lawyer's loyalty obligation of
continued service in all circumstances in which that obligation
exists, although, of course, lawyers are free under the Rules to
honor the obligation.
Thus, the cost to the client of disloyal abandonment is given
some weight, but not determinative weight, under the Model
Rules. Moreover, the lawyer is free to disloyally abandon a client
for almost any reason. The loyalty obligation of continued service,
when it is morally owing, is given very short shrift under the
Model Rules. The Rules permit disloyalty by abandonment in
circumstances in which it would be morally wrongful, for example,
when little or no moral justification for withdrawal is present.
2. Disclosing Client Confidences
Scrupulous disloyalty by disclosing client confidences also may
reflect either the lawyer's goal of avoiding personal participation
in a client's unacceptable plan or of defeating the plan. Also, it
may occur prior to the client's proposed course of conduct or
afterward.
Disclosure requires a recipient of the information. Harm to the
betrayed client may be more or less serious depending on who
receives the information. An intended victim may be warned so
that the harm to the victim can be averted, or the police may
be informed so that the client may be caught in the wrongful act
or otherwise held accountable for it. These different forms of
disclosure obviously impose different costs on the client.19°
Scrupulous disloyalty by disclosing client confidences to avoid
harm to third persons is one of the most divisive subjects in
legal ethics. Charles Wolfram described disagreements over ex-
ceptions to the confidentiality provisions of the proposed Model
Rules as "the most heated professional and public controversy"
concerning the Rules. 19' David Luban described the controversy
as "bitter" and "vituperative."' 92
Disclosure of client confidences is often the best means of
protecting third persons from wrongful conduct by the client. It
190. The Model Rules require minimization of the harm to the client. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1989) (stating that disclosure is permitted only to the
extent necessary to prevent the harmful consequences).
191. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 670.
192. LUBAN, supra note 22, at 181.
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can be a means for the lawyer to do good, rather than simply to
do no harm. At the same time, it usually imposes greater costs
on the client than withdrawing from representation, and, in that
way, disclosure usually is a more intense form of disloyalty than
withdrawal.
It is not surprising that disclosing client confidences for good
reason is so controversial, considering that it often involves both
greater good and greater evil than withdrawal, especially com-
pared to a withdrawal that is propitiously handled to minimize
client harm. Disloyalty by disclosure raises the stakes for all
concerned, and it usually requires greater justification.
The Model Rules, which in some circumstances permit disloy-
alty by client abandonment without requiring any justification, 193
are, for the most part, quite restrictive with respect to disloyalty
by disclosing client confidences. Disloyalty by disclosure is gen-
erally permitted to protect the lawyer herself from adverse legal
consequences and third parties from dire bodily harm.194 Disloy-
alty by disclosure is required, in some circumstances, to prevent
a tribunal from being deceived.195 On the other hand, the Rules
prohibit disclosure without client consent in many circumstances
in which a third party or the public in general may be seriously
harmed by the client's intended conduct.
The provisions permitting self-interested disloyalty by disclo-
sure privilege the lawyer's legal rights over loyalty to a client.196
To some extent, this conclusion is consistent with the principle
that the lawyer has no loyalty obligation to engage in illegal
conduct. That principle was defended on the basis that the
lawyer's promise of loyalty extends only to legal conduct and
that the purpose of furthering the client's autonomy within the
193. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
194. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b).
195. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(2).
196. See id. Rule 1.6(b)(2). I characterize the interest being protected as the lawyer's
legal rights. This characterization may be narrower than what the rule contemplates.
The comment to the Rule permits disclosure even though no formal proceeding has been
commenced and, perhaps, even though no formal proceeding is likely to be commenced.
Id. cmt. Dispute Concerning Lawyer's Conduct 1. At its outer reaches, the Rule may
permit self-interested disloyalty by disclosure simply to protect the lawyer's reputation,
even though the lawyer's silence may involve no foreseeable adverse legal consequences
to her. See generally Jennifer Cunningham, Note, Eliminating 'Backdoor' Access to Client
Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 992, 997 (1990) ("[COourts must begin to impose restrictions on the use of
the expanded self-defense exception to protect client confidences from unwarranted
intrusions by self-interested attorneys and overreaching third parties.").
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law does not warrant illegal conduct by the lawyer.197 A client,
therefore, should not be permitted to gain an unlawful advantage
over the lawyer, for example through an unfounded malpractice
action or by refusing to pay a lawful fee, by asserting a loyalty
obligation of confidentiality.
The Rules, however, do not limit the lawyer's self-interested
disloyalty by disclosure to instances in which the client is seeking
an unlawful advantage over the lawyer.198 Under the Rules, for
example, the lawyer has a legal right to disclose confidences in
mounting a defense to discipline charges, a proceeding in which
the client may be on the sidelines and seeks no advantage of any
sort.199
The self-interested disloyalty by disclosure permitted by the
Rules does not provide for the wholesale protection of lawyers.
Under the Rules, Lawyer A may not disclose client confidences
to protect Lawyer B against discipline charges, even though
Lawyer B is wrongly accused and may take a fall without Lawyer
A's help. Thus, the principal concern of these provisions is the
protection of the individual lawyer's legal rights and not some
broader interest in protecting the legal rights of all lawyers or
third persons. The message seems to be that each of us is entitled
to render our own first-hand account in asserting or defending
our legal rights, although we may be denied use of others'
accounts. In this sense, the Rules place lawyers on equal footing
with others, not in a superior position.
Nevertheless, the Rules provide crude standards for self-inter-
ested disloyalty by disclosure. When self-interested disloyalty by
disclosure is permitted, lawyers are not required to weigh their
benefit in disclosing against the cost to the client. The lawyer
may disclose only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary" to vindicate her legal rights, but this restriction
does not seem to prohibit the lawyer from disclosing to avoid a
minor harm to herself even though the disclosure will seriously
harm the client.
The Rules are also crude in their treatment -of injuries to third
persons. Disclosure is permitted only to prevent "imminent death
or substantial bodily harm" to third persons.201 Obviously, other
197. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
198. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b).
199. See id. Rule 1.6(b2) cmt. Dispute Concerning LawJer"s Conduct 1, 2.
200. Id. Rule 1.6(b).
201. Id. Rule 1.6(bX1).
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significant injuries can befall third persons, including extended
imprisonment, financial hardship, and the destruction of personal
relationships. Disloyal disclosure is not permitted to avoid these
injuries to third persons, even though the client may have little
or nothing to gain by the lawyer's silence.
The permissive disclosure rules, by virtue of their permissive
language, allow lawyers to weigh the costs to clients of disclosure
against the benefits to themselves and others before deciding
whether to disclose disloyally confidential information. When
disclosure is prohibited or required under the Rules, no such
weighing is allowed. In these cases, moral reasoning by the
lawyer is ostensibly preempted. One effect of this preemption is
to complicate the lawyer's moral decisionmaking by throwing into
the equation the prospect of civil disobedience and its untoward
consequences.
Under the withdrawal provisions of the Rules, lawyers are
always free to make morally sound decisions as to disloyalty by
client abandonment, although they are also free to make morally
unsound decisions. The same freedom is allowed under confiden-
tiality rules involving the lawyer's self-interest with respect to
her own legal rights. On the other hand, the confidentiality rules
do not always permit the lawyer to engage in responsible moral
action when the rights of third persons are involved. The loyalty
obligation of confidentiality is categorically privileged over many
moral concerns involving third persons, even though, in some
circumstances, those moral concerns should prompt disloyalty by
disclosure.
S. Lying to Clients
The lawyer may lie to the client by continuing to represent
the client, but doing so subversively, defeating the client's ob-
jectives from inside without the client even knowing it. This
form of disloyalty seems particularly pernicious in that it entails
morally troublesome conduct even apart from the disloyalty itself.
It would be too great a digression to enter the tangle of philo-
sophic arguments about lying, why it is wrong and when it is
justifiable. 20 2 Legal ethics rules categorically prohibit lying, even
to nonclients. 203
202. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978);
FRIED, supra note 91, at 54-78 (1978).
203. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1989) (stating that lawyers
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Lying to a client sometimes may be the most effective means
of defeating a client's wrongful plan. Even so, the wrongfulness
of lying, especially to a client, raises serious doubts about whether
this form of disloyalty is ever justifiable. The most likely context
in which lying to a client would be defended is the paternalistic
He "for the client's own good.' 204 Sissela Bok offers a cautionary
appraisal of paternalistic lies:
[Platernalistic lies, while they are easy to understand and to
sympathize with at times, also carry very special risks: risks
to the liar himself from having to lie more and more in order
to keep up the appearance among people he lives with or sees
often, and thus from the greater likelihood of discovery and
loss of credibility; risks to the relationship in which the decep-
tion takes place; and risks of exploitation of every kind for the
deceived.25
I can imagine no case in which disloyalty by lying to the client
would be justified by a goal of avoiding participation in the
client's wrongful plan. Client abandonment always would be a
morally superior means to avoid participation than would lying.
Circumstances may exist, however, in which a client's plan can
be defeated only by lying; circumstances in which neither aban-
donment nor disclosure is likely to defeat the client's plan. Lies
in this context may be paternalistic or for the benefit of a third
party or the public.
One practical factor that militates against lying, even in the
most extreme circumstances, is that lying often would disable
the lawyer from encouraging the client to do what is right. When
the lawyer's position is known to the client, the lawyer's lie may
be less believable. Certainly, the happiest outcome is for the
are prohibited from engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation"). But see id. Rule 4.1 cmt. (stating that certain misrepresentations in nego-
tiation may be permissible); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Lyring to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. Rnv.
659, 663 (1990) ("Lawyers deceive their clients more than is generally acknowledged by
the ethics codes or by the bar.").
204. "If a deceptive statement is necessary to accomplish some legitimate purpose,
such as protecting someone from needless harm, one might consider the deception
justifiable unless the speaker could have accomplished the same purpose without decep-
tion." Lerman, supra note 203, at 678 (emphasis added); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden
Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1990) (suggesting paternalistic deception may be
justified in circumstances in which lawyers withhold information they themselves would
not want to know if they were in their clients' positions).
205. BOK, supra note 202, at 218-19.
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client to abandon the wrongful plan. The lawyer who lies to the
client presumably concludes that this best possible solution will
not work. Before a lawyer abandons the solution that is most
acceptable morally, extraordinarily compelling reasons to do so
must be present. Disloyalty by lying to the client is difficult to
justify under almost any imaginable set of facts.
4. Costs of Disloyalty
A wide range of costs can accompany scrupulous disloyalty,
depending on how the decision to be disloyal is implemented.
Although it seems reasonable to conclude that stronger reasons
are required for more costly disloyalty than for disloyalty that
imposes smaller costs, this conclusion is troubling. It counte-
nances, in some circumstances, the lawyer sitting by and letting
the client accomplish a wrongful objective (or employ wrongful
means) after the lawyer's withdrawal, while it prohibits the
lawyer's active efforts to defeat the wrongful objective (or wrong-
ful means). In other words, it sometimes privileges doing no harm
over doing good. A moral universe so constructed seems built
upside down.
Notwithstanding this considerable problem, it is sometimes
better to resolve loyalty dilemmas. by doing no harm rather than
by doing good knowing that some harm will result as well.
Utilitarian considerations dictate that we should not impose more
serious harm on a client to avoid a lesser harm to others.
Moreover, we may reach moral decisions with more or less
certainty that we are right. We may conclude that a client's plan
is wrongful, although still entertaining some doubt that it is
wrongful. Even more to the point, we may decide that we must
be scrupulously disloyal, although still abhorring the disloyalty
that we plan.
These problems can be solved if scrupulous disloyalty is inap-
propriate in cases of such moral qualms, but this solution misses
the point. The duty and presumption of loyal conduct should
insure moral qualms. A lawyer should doubt the rectitude of her
decision to be disloyal; and a moral universe that recognizes
moral ambiguity, especially in the face of competing moral claims,
is not upside down at all.
The lawyer's relative confidence in her decision to be scrupu-
lously disloyal is a factor in determining the methods and goal
in implementing that decision. Proportionality is a factor, as well.
The lawyer should not grievously harm a client to avert minor
harm the client intends to inflict on others. The extent of the
424 [Vol. 33:367
LAWYERS AND LOYALTY
lawyer's efforts to persuade the client to abandon the unaccept-
able plan is also a consideration. It is hypocritical for the lawyer
to speak softly and carry a big stick when dealing with a client.
Unless the lawyer has exhausted other possibilities, disloyalty
that imposes high costs on the client seems clearly out of the
question.
A second cost of disloyalty, in addition to the cost imposed on
the individual client, must be considered as well. It is widely
believed that clients are willing to trust lawyers only to the
extent they believe that their lawyers will be loyal to them.2
Disloyal acts by lawyers may, therefore, threaten all lawyer-
client relationships in that, if such disloyal acts are known, clients
will generally be less trusting of their lawyers.
A regime of rules that forbids all disloyalty would presumably
go the farthest to insure that clients trust their lawyers. Al-
though client trust is an important concern, it is not the sole
concern. This observation explains why some disloyal acts by
lawyers have always been legally permitted. Clients should not
trust lawyers to lie for them or to commit crimes for them.
Moreover, lawyers should not induce a trust that they cannot
honor.
The secondary effects of legitimate lawyer disloyalty on other
clients is a problem only insofar as other clients misperceive the
extent of a lawyer's loyalty obligation. Thus, the secondary cost
of legitimate- lawyer disloyalty is directly related to the extent
to which clients generally understand the limits on a lawyer's
loyalty obligation. It is a mistake to discourage properly disloyal
conduct on the basis that it will undermine trust in lawyers
generally. The problem of secondary costs is better addressed
by educating clients than by misplacing moral values.2
206. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & WmLiAm W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
128 (1985):
Although there is little empirical evidence of the precise degree to which
clients rely on the principle of confidentiality, it is intuitively obvious that
lawyers operating under a binding requirement of confidentiality will have
at least some greater ability to gain the trust of at least some clients, and
hence to serve them competently.
Id.; FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 87 (stating: "A client is not likely to give her lawyer
facts that might be incriminating or embarrassing, however, unless she is assured that
the lawyer will maintain the information in confidence.").
207. A recent study "revealed widespread misunderstanding among clients" as to the
extent of the lawyer's loyalty obligation to preserve client confidences. Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethining Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 381 (1989). In addition, the study
suggested "that the general sense of trust in attorneys as professionals-rather than
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V. CONCLUSION
This discussion makes clear that several factors appropriately
influence a lawyer's decision whether to be disloyal to a client,
including the cost to the client, the purpose to be served by
acting disloyally, and the methods by which the disloyalty may
be acted out. Loyalty dilemmas require complex judgments that
cannot be reached wisely unless all relevant moral factors are
considered. The Model Rules systematically fail to do this. In
some Model Rule provisions, neither the cost to the client nor
the purpose to be served by the disloyal conduct is adequately
considered.
The tendency in the Model Rules is to attempt bright-line
distinctions governing various loyalty dilemmas when an analysis
and balancing of factors is needed. Sometimes, the Rules under-
value loyalty concerns; other times, such concerns are overvalued.
Sometimes, the Rules give lawyers too much discretion; other
times, too little. The problem with the withdrawal and confiden-
tiality rules is that they are based on a fundamental misconcep-
tion about how loyalty concerns relate to responsible moral
conduct. The costs and benefits of (dis)loyal action must always
be considered before a lawyer can choose how to act responsibly,
and the Model Rules usually undervalue at least one of these
concerns.
The complex moral decisionmaking that loyalty dilemmas re-
quire is short-circuited by the crude directives of the Model
Rules. The ethos of the Rules is troubling in two respects. First,
although generally empowering the lawyer to do no harm, the
lawyer is sometimes disempowered from doing good. Second,
lawyers remain free to do harm in many respects.
Sweeping changes in the positive law regulating lawyers must
occur before the law could prescribe the process of reflection in
resolving loyalty dilemmas that moral philosophy prescribes. Pos-
itive law is rarely more than a crude reflection of the complex
moral concerns on which it is often based. The Model Rules
contemplate the moral questions posed by loyalty dilemmas, but
they resolve those questions far too categorically to be wise
solutions.
particularly strict confidentiality rules-is what fosters client candor." Id. at 386. These
findings support the contentions that clients need to be educated as to the extent of
lawyers' loyalty obligations and that the extent of those obligations does not necessarily
control whether a client is likely to trust her lawyer.
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In the end, the lawyer's loyalty obligation to clients is given
uneven legal protection, as it should be. Loyalty is a powerful
moral force for the lawyer, but, at times, more powerful moral
forces come into play in the lawyer's work. Loyalty to clients
should be legally required to some extent. The problem, of course,
is in defining the extent. The law tends to pursue categorical
distinctions for resolving loyalty problems. An analysis of factors
and a balancing of interests would comport more fully with the
nature of the loyalty obligation.
